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INTRODUCTION
Among the most controversial practices to arise in recent years
in public and private employment is the use of race/gender-con-
scious criteria in affirmative action plans to influence hiring and
promotion decisions. Supporters of the use of these criteria defend
them as absolutely indispensable to achieving equality of employ-
ment opportunity. Opponents condemn them as "reverse discrimi-
nation."' This article examines the use of race/gender-conscious
"Affirmative action" encompasses a broad spectrum of activities designed "to overcome
the effects of past or present practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment
opportunity." EEOC Guidelines, Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of' 1964, 29 C.F.R, 1608.1(c) (1985). It includes training plans and programs,
recruiting activity, elimination of any adverse impact caused by selection criteria not validated
pursuant to EEOC Guidelines, and modification of promotion and layoff procedures. Id.
1608.3(c); see also Office of Compliance of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1-2.32 (1987).
Most of the controversy involving affirmative action has centered around "reverse dis-
crimination" decisions giving preferences in hiring or promotions to either identified victims
of employment discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or
to non-victims who share the "offending" characteristic that triggered the employer's conduct.
As between relief for identified victims and relief for non-victims, non-victim relief is by far
more controversial. Hiring and promotion preferences generally occur as a result of a
judgment following trial, a judgment entered upon the parties' consent, or a voluntary
agreement.
The content of voluntary agreements providing For race/gender-conscious relief varies
considerably from industry to industry and from employer to employer. When relief is
granted either after trial or upon entry of a consent judgment, it generally includes the
following components irrespective of whether the underlying action arose under Title VII
or the fourteenth amendment: first, "compliance relief," in which the court enjoins the
prohibited practices and requires the hiring or promotion of actual victims; second, "com-
pensatory relief," in which the court orders awards of backpay and constructive seniority to
make whole the victims; and third, "affirmative relief," in which the court remedies the
effects of discrimination which are not cured by the granting of compliance or compensatory
relief. This third category of relief includes percentage hiring or promotions that benefit
non-victims. Berkman v, City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1983). Model
judgments or consent decrees containing provisions that illustrate these forms of relief are
reprinted at Empl. Prac. Guide (CCFI) y 1484-97. See also Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679
F.2d 541, 573-79 (6th Cir. 1982) (appendices), reu'd sub nom. Firelighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Sams, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1342-51
(5th Cir. 1980) (appendices), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam).
4	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1
criteria, particularly by public sector employers, the most influential
group of employers in the national economy.
The debate surrounding affirmative action plans raises an issue
fundamental to American society since its inception: the meaning
of equality — especially racial and sexual equality. 2 Both the sup-
porters and opponents of these controversial programs have looked
to the United States Supreme Court to settle definitively the issue
of their statutory and constitutional validity. But after nine major
decisions in the last ten years, the Court is still sounding an uncer-
tain trumpet. Neither supporters nor opponents of affirmative ac-
tion can claim victory, and the final outcome looks as unpredictable
as a World Series finale going into extra innings. Indeed, the Justices
themselves look less and less like umpires and more and more like
players: three pro-affirmative action, two anti, and four free agents. 3
The Court has recently handed down its ninth major decision
in this intellectually and emotionally charged area. 4 The retirement
For a stimulating critique of the traditional forms of relief and the formulation of a new
approach see Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Under Title
VII: The Access Principle, 65 Tax. L. REV. 41 (1986).
The Court's most recent affirmative action cases have been a source of lively scholarly
discussion. E.g., Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII:
From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1987); Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987
Affirmative Action Cases: ft's All Over but the Shouting, 86 Mimi. L. REV. 524 (1987); Selig,
Affirmative Action in Employment: The Legacy of a Supreme Court Majority, 63 IND. L. REV. 301
(1987).
5 The pro's are Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun; the anti's are Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia; the free agents are Justices White, Stevens, O'Connor and
Kennedy (and before Justice Kennedy's appointment, Justice Powell). For a complete expla-
nation of this breakdown, see infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
For ease of reference, each of the nine cases is fully cited below, followed by a brief
description of its facts and a citation to the text where further factual information is given.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987) (Title
VII reverse discrimination case brought by a male who was passed over for a promotion to
a road dispatcher's job in favor of an arguably less qualified woman). See infra notes 72-77
and accompanying text. United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (equal protection
reverse discrimination claim brought by white state troopers challenging a judicially-imposed
50/50 promotion plan implemented following the district court's finding of egregious dis-
crimination; the quota was actually used only once). See infra note 127 and accompanying
text, Local Number 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986)
(Title VII reverse discrimination claim by white firefighters challenging a consent judgment
entered into by the city and a black firefighter association which called for promotion quotas).
See infra notes 120, 192-94 and accompanying text. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers'
Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (Title VII reverse discrimination claim brought
by a union objecting to a judicially-imposed 29% membership goal, following the district
court's finding of persistent, egregious discrimination). See infra note 119 and accompanying
text. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986) (equal protection reverse
discrimination claim brought by white school teachers with greater seniority who were laid
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of justice Lewis F. Powell at the end of the October 1986 Term and
the appointment of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on February 18,
1988 may have a dramatic impact on the Court's jurisprudence.
Now is an appropriate time, therefore, to conduct an analysis of
the legality, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
under the equal protection clause, of public sector employment
plans that contain race/gender-conscious criteria as part of an affir-
mative action program.
With nine decisions in place, it is possible to discern with some
degree of particularity which issues of law have been resolved, which
remain open, and how each of the eight veteran justices approaches
the problems. It is also possible to gain some insight into the dif-
ference that Justice Kennedy's presence in the lineup may make.
Unfortunately, reaching final answers to many of the most impor-
tant questions remains problematic. The opinions in the nine cases
are lengthy, incohesive, contradictory, and ambiguous. They occupy
over five hundred fifty-four pages in the official reporters and
consist of forty-six majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions. Even within a single case, it is often impossible to discern
the Court's holding because not every justice in the majority will
endorse the entire majority opinion. Often there is no majority
opinion, only a plurality opinion. Concurring opinions severely re-
strict the scope of the majority/plurality opinion. On occasion, dis-
senting opinions even "agree" with many of the principles enunci-
ated in the majority/plurality opinion, thereby establishing new law
off pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement to protect. the jobs of minority teachers
with less seniority in order to preserve gains in minority teacher recruitment). See infra notes
90-99 and accompanying text. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984) (challenge by it lire department arid firefighters' union to a district court order
modifying, over their objection, a consent judgment in order to prevent the layoff of recently
hired minority firefighters; the minority firefighters were originally hired to settle a Title
VII action alleging discriminatory hiring and promotion practices). See infra notes 183-84
and accompanying text. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (constitutional challenge
to a federal statute enacted by Congress pursuant to its authority under the commerce clause,
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and Congress's taxing and spending power; the
statute set aside 10 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the Public Works Employment
Act of 1977 for minority business enterprises). See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying
text. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title VII reverse discrimi-
nation claim against a private employer challenging the establishment of a training program
that limited its enrollment to 50 percent white trainees, reserving 50 percent of its enrollment
for black trainees). See infra. notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (equal protection reverse discrimination challenge to a
state medical school's admissions policy that reserved 16 out of 100 seats exclusively for
minority group members). See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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or lending new support to principles that did not command support
in earlier decisions.
The opinions' analytical disarray has four roots. First, the de-
gree of congruency between the applicable antidiscrimination
norms contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is uncer-
tain. Second, the Court has unsuccessfully attempted to transfer the
principles of liability developed under Title VII to voluntary deci-
sions by public sector employers to adopt affirmative action plans
containing race/gender-conscious criteria under both Title VII and
the equal protection clause. Third, in not one reverse discrimination
case has the Court considered both the Title VII and the equal
protection clause issues together; the Court has always considered
the claims in separate actions. Fourth, the Justices have jurispru-
dential misgivings concerning the use of such criteria in general.
Part I of this article addresses the uncertain relationship be-
tween Title VII and the equal protection clause. Part II examines
two issues that have repeatedly claimed the Court's attention: the
nature of the employer-specific, factual predicate required to sup-
port voluntary race/gender-conscious employment decisions; and
whether societal discrimination is an acceptable predicate for such
decisions. These issues were selected because they illustrate the
difficulty the Court has faced in resolving basic questions underlying
the voluntary adoption of race/gender-conscious programs by pub-
lic sector employers. Both issues, moreover, sharply reveal the
Court's ideological splintering. Finally, an examination of the
Court's treatment of the factual predicate and societal discrimina-
tion issues evidences the holistic nature of the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence, in which Title VII and equal protection clause
cases are frequently cited interchangeably.5
Part III addresses a major cause of the opinions' non-cohesive-
ness, namely, the shifting coalitions of the Justices themselves. Al-
though readily acknowledging that the terms "liberal" and "conser-
vative" are too often a pale substitute for analysis, this article
nonetheless suggests that these terms, if appropriately defined and
limited, provide a useful framework for examining the individual
Justices' jurisprudence in reverse discrimination cases. The liberal
camp consists of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, and
the conservative camp consists of Chief Justice Rehnquist and J us-
See infra notes 56-144 and accompanying text.
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tice Scalia. Each camp's jurisprudence is straightforward and self-
contained. The Justices in the two camps vote either "up" or "down"
in accordance with their clearly enunciated views. What underlies
the Court's institutional instability is not the near-polar ideologies
of the two camps. Instead, the instability derives from neither
camp's ability to command a clear majority of votes. Both camps
have depended on the votes of Justices White, Stevens, Powell, and
O'Connor. Part III thus addresses the divided Court, examining
the views of these four Justices against the backdrop of the core
principles of the two camps. It also explores Justice. Kennedy's
voting pattern and decisions in civil rights cases while a circuit judge.
Part IV offers three suggestions to repair the Court's fractured
affirmative action jurisprudence. First, it urges the Court to reject
the call of some of the Justices for the overruling of United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber, 6
 the seminal case approving the use of
race-conscious employment criteria under Title VII. Second, it
urges Congress to exercise its power under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment to amend Title VII to expressly authorize the
states to adopt race/gender-conscious plans. Third, Part IV urges
the Court to modify or distinguish certain principles that have
evolved in the context of employment-related affirmative action
plans in order to permit the states to set aside modest percentages
of public contracts for minority businesses without violating the
equal protection clause.
I. THE UNCERTAIN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE VII AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Origins of the Problem
As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
contained a series of sweeping prohibitions, essentially precluding
private employers, unions, and employment agencies from consid-
ering race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any fashion in
their decision-making processes.' It constituted an overwhelmingly
6
 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979),
7
 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1982). Section 2000e-2 provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
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powerful statement by Congress that these factors must be irrele-
vant to private employment in the United States. Congress delib-
erately excluded federal and state employees from the statute's
coverage because political pressures made the passage of the statute
impossible if these groups were included and because of constitu-
tional concerns about the scope of Congress's authority over state
employment practices. 8
The failure of Congress to apply this non-discrimination norm
to public employers left a gap with both moral and legal implica-
tions. From a moral perspective, it hardly appeared seemly for
Congress to outlaw discrimination in the private sector while tol-
erating it in the public sector. The response to this moral objection,
was, of course, that statutory relief was not needed: the equal pro-
tection clause barred public sector employers from considering race,
color, religion, or national origin in making employment decisions.
To what degree the equal protection clause prohibited gender-based
distinctions was uncertain in 1964. 9
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to
classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin...,
(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization —
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for,metn-
bership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section....
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor orga-
nization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discrim-
inate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide
apprenticeship or other training.
Id.
Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 824 (1972).
9 Prior to 1971, the Court used the traditional rational basis standard to test the consti-
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By 1972, ample political support existed for extending Title
VI l's coverage to public sector employees, and Congress entertained
fewer doubts about the scope of its constitutional authority over
state employment practices as a result of several Supreme Court
decisions in the intervening period.'° Three specific considerations
prompted Congress to extend Title VII's coverage to the public
sector. First, there was considerable evidence that racial animus
played a large role in employment decisions in both the North and
the South despite the equal protection clause's ban on discrimina-
tion." Second, racially discriminatory employment decisions had a
particularly significant impact on "governmental activities which are
most visible to the minority communities (notably education, law
enforcement, and the administration of justice) with the result that
the credibility of the government's claim to represent all the people
is negated." 12 Third, the absence of an administrative remedy to
resolve complaints of discrimination by public employees frustrated
the nation's policy of equal employment opportunity. Congress be-
lieved that because of the expense and time involved constitutional
redress was "an empty promise . . . [for] disadvantaged individu-
als."' 3
In light of these considerations Congress amended Title VII
in 1972. Consequently, public sector employers became subject to
Title VII's prohibitions in addition to those of the equal protection
clause. Trying to flesh out the relationship between the two norms
is not an easy task. Two persistent problems have claimed the
tutionality of gender-based statutes. Irrespective of whether the state statute operated to
advance or retard women's economic or political rights, the Court's decisions regularly relied
upon stereotypical considerations concerning the role of women in society and their physical
frailties. E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U,S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
In 1971, the Court for the first time struck down a gender-based statute applying a
heightened rational basis test. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Following Reed, the Court
struggled to arrive at a consensus concerning the appropriate standard of review. Compare
Frontier° v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) with Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) and
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). Finally, the Court formulated the so-called
"intermediate" standard to test gender-based statutes. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives"); accord Mississippi Univ. for
Women v, Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
'° E.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
II H.R. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2(1 Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2137, 2152.
is
	 at 2153.
Id. at 2153-54.
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Court's attention: the degree to which the principles establishing an
employer's liability under Title VII and the equal protection clause
overlap, and the relationship of the liability principles of both norms
to principles controlling a public sector employer's decision to adopt
voluntarily a race/gender-conscious plan. These problems are dis-
cussed below.
B. Different Rules for Establishing Liability Under Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause
1. Title VII
Generally speaking, there are two theories of Title VII liability:
disparate treatment and disparate impact." In a disparate treatment
case, the plaintiff focuses on the employer's motives, claiming that
it deliberately treated the plaintiff less favorably because of the
plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The evidence
in a disparate treatment case is frequently anecdotal, but often the
plaintiff supplements it with statistical data showing the employer
has treated others similarly situated in a like discriminatory manner.
In contrast, in a disparate impact case, the employer's motives are
irrelevant, As the Supreme Court observed in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,' 5 the seminal adverse impact case, "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability . . • Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.'" Under both the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories of liability, the Court has
encouraged plaintiffs to rely heavily on complex, sophisticated
forms of statistical proof. 17
One of the most useful tools available to an employer in as-
sessing potential Title VII liability under either theory is a statistical
comparison between the percentage of minorities and women in its
work force and the percentage of minorities and women in the
14 See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1286-1394 (2d
ed. 1983).
15
 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
16 1d. at 432 (emphasis in the original).
' 7 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 56 U.S.L.W. 4922, 4927 n.3 (1988); Basemore
v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398-404 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); W. CONNOLLY & D.
PETERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION B-1—B-24 (1988); SCHLEI
& GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 11, 98-101.
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appropriate labor pool. It has been repeatedly acknowledged that
"[i]n cases concerning racial discrimination, 'statistics' often tell
much and the Courts listen.'" A statistical comparison may readily
reveal that the employer is treating minorities or women differently
or that such neutral practices as testing procedures, height and
weight requirements, and educational requirements are adversely
affecting members of the protected groups.' 9
 The Court explained
the rationale underlying statistical comparisons in Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 2° a case that is critical to understanding the
Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. In Hazelwood, the govern-
ment accused the school district of discriminating against black
applicants for teaching positions. In large measure, its case rested
upon statistical evidence, (I) comparing the percentage of black
teachers actually employed to the percentage of black students in
the school system and (2) comparing the percentage of black teach-
ers actually employed to the percentage of black teachers in the
relevant labor market area.
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the first comparison. Be-
cause teaching required special qualifications, a comparison based
on the racial composition of the pupil population or the labor force
had little probative value. 2 ' Accordingly, it held that only the second
comparison was valid under Title VII. Ultimately, it vacated the
judgment of liability against the school district and remanded the
case for additional findings concerning the relevant labor market
area. In the course of reaching that decision, the Court made clear
why only the second statistical comparison was valid.
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily expected that non-
discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work
force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired. Evidence of long-lasting and
gross disparity between the composition of a work force
and that of the general population thus may be significant
18 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970),
' 1) See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (gender-based impact of height
and weight requirements); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (racial impact
of employment tests); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (same). The importance
of statistical proof in adverse impact cases cannot be disputed. "[Tihe use of statistics remains
the dominant method of establishing a prima fade adverse impact case." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
supra note 14, at 152.
28 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
2 ' Id. at 308 n.18.
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even though 703(j) makes clear that Title VII imposes
no requirement that a work force mirror the general pop-
ulation. 22
Hazelwood thus established the proposition that evidence of
"long-standing and gross disparity" created a prima facie case. It
cannot be emphasized too strongly, however, that Hazelwood was a
pure Title VII liability case. It had nothing whatsoever to do with
an employer's voluntary decision to implement an affirmative action
plan containing race/gender-conscious criteria. The question
whether Hazelwood should be transferred wholesale to such a plan
has been a constant source of division on the Court. The conser-
vative camp Justices insist that only Hazelwood -like statistics sufficient
to establish a direct prima facie case can serve as an acceptable factual
predicate for voluntary race/gender-conscious programs.23 The lib-
eral camp Justices insist that a less rigorous statistical disparity is
acceptable. 24 The problem is further exacerbated by the Court's
failure in both liability and reverse discrimination cases to articulate
clear guidelines for measuring statistical discrepancies. 25 In the ab-
sence of such guidelines, "evidence of long-lasting and gross
disparity"26 is essentially a meaningless standard.
2. Equal Protection Clause
Establishing liability under the equal protection clause is more
difficult than establishing liability under Title VII. Suggestions of
difficulty were first sounded in Washington v. Davis. 27 In that case, a
group of rejected black candidates for police officer positions in the
District of Columbia challenged an employment test, alleging it
violated the equal protection component of the fifth amendment
due process clause.28 Their case rested principally on the dispro-
portionate impact of the test: black applicants failed the test at a
22 Id. at 307 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
340 n.20 (1977)).
" See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 98-101 and &WI'. 1983 at 11-12.
26
 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (quoting International
Bhd, of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977)).
" 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
" Unlike the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment does not contain an equal
protection guarantee component. This is a difference without a distinction, however, because
the Court has read an equal protection component into the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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much higher rate than whites. 29 Although the Court acknowledged
that disproportionate impact created a prima facie case under Title
VII, it firmly refused to transfer Title VII's disparate impact theory
to equal protection claims, insisting instead upon a constitutional
standard of actual discriminatory purpose."
Because disparate impact was much easier to demonstrate than
actual, purposeful discrimination, after Washington v. Davis, victims
of employment discrimination in the public sector clearly had an
incentive to rely upon Title VII. The Court increased that incentive
the following year in Dothard v. Rawlinson" when it resolved the
issue whether Title VII case law determining the liability of private
employers was equally applicable to public sector employers. The
Court had little difficulty in responding affirmatively to that ques-
tion based on the amendment's legislative history. Congress clearly
intended the same principles to apply.
As a result of the holdings in Davis and Rawlinson, Title VII
became the preferred tool of public sector applicants and employees
in pressing claims of race and gender discrimination. Correspond-
ingly, public sector employers faced greater prospects of liability
under Title VII than under the equal protection clause because the
disparate impact standard was much easier to satisfy than the con-
stitutional standard of purposeful intent. Recognizing the increased
prospect of liability under Title VII, public sector employers, like
their private sector counterparts, began to consider the use of af-
firmative action programs to eradicate, or at least lessen, the effect
of the employment practices that created the offending disparate
impact in the first place. In turn, also like their private sector
counterparts, they walked a "tightrope," risking liability to their
minority employees by not correcting the vestiges of the discrimi-
nation and risking liability to non-minority employees if they
adopted such programs without adequate proof of their potential
Title VII liability. 32 From the public sector employers' perspective,
29 426 U.S. at 232-37.
3° Id. at 238-48. The Court explained its refusal to adopt an impact test as follows:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid,
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race
more than another would be far reaching and would raise several questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and to the average black than to the more affluent white.
Id. at 248.
433 U.S. 321,331-32 n.14 (1977).
32 This tightrope metaphor, which courts frequently invoke in affirmative action cases,
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the fundamental affirmative action question was whether the statis-
tical data they compiled constituted a sufficient "factual predicate"
to permit them to adopt race/gender-conscious employment criteria.
In sum, a primary cause of the incoherence in the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence can be traced to the different rules
for establishing liability under Title VII and the equal protection
clause. Hazelwood and Davis are pure liability cases, involving the
issue of the kind and quantum of proof that a plaintiff needs to
establish a prima facie case. As will be discussed in Part II, the
question with which the Court is wrestling in affirmative action cases
is the flip side of this issue: how much, and what kind of information
does a public sector employer need as a factual predicate before it
may conclude it has discriminated in the past?
The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that,
although the Justices generally agree that the rules for establishing
liability under Title VII and the equal protection clause are differ-
ent, some of the Justices believe the rules governing this "flip side"
issue should be the same. Thus, as discussed in Part II, the Court's
condemnation of societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate
under the equal protection clause and its sub silentio acceptance of
it in the guise of an adverse impact analysis under Title VII adds
another element of uncertainty.
C. Unsettled Questions Concerning the Standard of Appellate Review
In pure Title VII cases, the Court has directly admitted to
using a "clearly erroneous" standard to review liability determina-
tions and an "abuse of discretion" standard to review the forms of
relief granted by the district court, such as compensatory seniority,
back pay, forward pay, etc." In Title VII reverse discrimination
cases, the Court has been strangely silent and has not explored the
standard of review issue at all."
can be traced to Judge Wisdom's dissent in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 563 F.2d
216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), reild, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally
Comment, Walking a Tightrope Without a Net: Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans After Weber,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1986).
"Compare Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) and
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273 (1982) (clearly erroneous standard of review) with International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364-65, 371-76 (1977) and Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 763-66, 770-72 (1976) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-16,
419-22, 424-25 (1975) (abuse of discretion standard of review).
34 E.g. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1445-57 (standard of review not discussed); Local 28, 106
S. Ct. at 3025-54 (same); Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-209 (same).
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In contrast, in constitutional cases, the Court has been openly
divided and frequently explored the issue. There are three consti-
tutional standards of review: the strict scrutiny test, the intermediate
test, and the rational basis test. Only the first two are implicated in
affirmative action cases." In general, the degree of scrutiny is a
function of the state's purpose. If the state uses race to disadvantage
an individual, the Court will apply the strict scrutiny standard —
the state must show that the racial classification serves a compelling
government interest and that the means are narrowly tailored to
the accomplishment of that purpose."
The unanimity found when race is used to disadvantage breaks
down when reverse discrimination claims are raised. At least four
Justices believe that strict scrutiny should be applied even if the
challenged statute or government program is using the racial clas-
sification to confer a benefit. In their view, "Nadal classifications
are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connec-
tion between justification and classification." 37 On the other hand,
at least three Justices maintain that if the state uses race to confer
a benefit on a group traditionally subject to discrimination, the
Court should apply the intermediate test — the state must show
that the racial classification serves an important government pur-
pose and is substantially related to the accomplishment of that
purpose." For these Justices, a less exacting standard is appropriate
because of the state's "legitimate ... objective of eliminating the
pernicious vestiges of past discrimination . "39
The inability of the Court to reach a consensus on which stan-
dard to apply is a serious deficiency in these cases. This lack of
55 The Court uses the rational basis test, the most deferential of the three standards,
when reviewing economic and social welfare legislation if no "suspect class" or fundamental
right is implicated. The rational basis test requires only a legitimate end and a rational
relationship between the means and the end. Of the three standards, it is the one most
deferential to the politically accountable branches of government. See United States v. Car-
otene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Bankers Life Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988); Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
" E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967). See generally Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cut. L. REV.
723 (1974); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 •lAitv, L, REV. 1 (1972).
" Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 (1986) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
58 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (1978) (opinion of' Brennan, J.
joined by White, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J.). Justice White's continued adherence to this
test is open to question. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
" Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1861 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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agreement is exacerbated by the Court's use of the intermediate
standard for gender-based distinctions. Although the Supreme
Court has never reviewed affirmative action, employment-related
plans benefitting women in a constitutional context, in other con-
texts it has insisted that gender-based statutes and programs must
serve an important governmental objective and be substantially re-
lated to the accomplishment of that purpose.4 ° This formulation
parallels the lesser standard of review that some Justices would
apply to race-conscious plans.
On occasion, the confusion concerning the appropriate stan-
dard of review has led to the lower courts reaching anomalous
results. For example, in reviewing a program benefitting three cat-
egories of businesses — businesses owned by minority group mem-
bers, women, and local residents — the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit applied the strict scrutiny test and struck down the
portion of the plan benefitting minority-owned businesses. It ap-
plied the intermediate test to uphold that portion of the plan ben-
efitting women-owned businesses.'" It applied the rational basis test
to uphold that portion of the plan benefitting businesses owned by
local residents. 42
 The selection of these tests in this order had the
anomalous result of benefitting women and white males over blacks,
a result offensive to the history of racial discrimination in this
country.'"
" E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
'' Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., v. City and County of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922, 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1987).
42 Id. at 939-40.
43
 In order to avoid anomalous results such as this and in an attempt to reconcile the
diverse views of the Justices, several appellate courts have interpreted the Court's opinions
prior to Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), as permitting the use of
the intermediate test in reverse discrimination cases, but have grafted on to it the "impact"
analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Weber to protect "innocent" non-minority em-
ployees. E.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1130-
32 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878,
884 n.18 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); La Rivicre v. EEOC, 682 F.2d
1275, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1982); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 511 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1982); Local Union No. 35, 1nel Bhd. of Eke. Workers v. City of
Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 421-23 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Zaslawsky
v. Board of Educ., 610 F.2d 661, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1979); Britton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 593 F. Supp, 1223, 1231 (N.D. [rid. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985),
vacated, 783 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1986); Marsh v. Board of Educ., 581 F. Supp. 614, 624 (E.D.
Mich. 1984), aff 'd, 762 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher,
679 F.2d 965, 965-97 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom.
Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (1983);
Jacobs, Justice Out of Balance: Voluntary Race-Conscious Affirmative Action in State and Local
December 1988]	 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION	 17
Finally, as if there were not already enough confusion concern-
ing which constitutional standard of review is applicable in reverse
discrimination cases, an argument exists that in imposing race-con-
scious relief in a pure Title VII liability case, and in approving a
consent judgment in a pure Title VII liability case the district court's
orders are subject to a constitutional standard of review because
judicial decision-making must conform to the equal protection com-
ponent of the due process clause of the fifth amendment."
D. The Court's Solicitude for Promoting Voluntary Settlements of
Employment Discrimination Claims
The preceding discussion highlights some elements of the un-
certain relationship between Title VII and the equal protection
clause. There is, however, one very important doctrinal link between
the Court's Title VII and equal protection clause jurisprudence.
Simply stated, even though they may disagree on the principles
applicable to the underlying issues, a majority of the Justices are
committed to an institutional policy of encouraging voluntary res-
olution of employment discrimination claims.
The commitment of these Justices, as expressed in their Title
VII opinions, has rested on four interrelated considerations. First,
in enacting Title VII Congress clearly "intended cooperation and
conciliation to be the 'preferred means of achieving [the objectives
of] Title VII." 45 Second, Congress enacted Title VII penalties to
prompt employers '"to self-examine and to self-evaluate their em-
ployment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible,
Government, 17 Ulm. LAW. 1, 25 (1985); Kreiling & Mercurio, Beyond Weber: The Broadening
Scope of Judicial Approval of Affirmative Action, 88 MGR. L. REV. 46, 79 (1983). See infra note
143 and accompanying text. After Wygant, the correctness of such an approach is highly
dubious. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
44 Compare Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1080-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) with id. at 1076-79
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
" W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Intl Union of United Rubber Workers of Am.,
461 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1983); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982);
Carson v. American Brands, lnc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). The Alexander Court observed that:
Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means
for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state
and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission,
would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation,
and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to tile a lawsuit.
Id. at 44.
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the last vestiges' of their discriminatory practices." 46 Third, Con-
gress intended that Title VII intrude as minimally as possible into
traditional managerial decisions relating to employment. 47 Fourth,
the EEOC, the federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII,
has issued regulations encouraging voluntary settlements in the
form of consent decrees.48
The importance these Justices attach to voluntary settlements
is dramatically illustrated by Local Number 93, International Association
of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 49
 one of the nine reverse
discrimination cases that the Supreme Court has decided. In City of
Cleveland, the firefighters' union challenged a consent decree be-
tween the city and an association representing minority firefighters
which provided for race-conscious promotions." The union argued
that the district court had violated section 706(g) of Title VII by
entering a consent judgment that benefitted black firefighters who
were not themselves actual victims of discrimination. Its argument
rested on the plain language of section 706(g) which prohibited a
court from ordering the promotion of any employee who was not
personally a victim of the employer's discriminatory conduct. 51 The
Court declined to reach that argument, holding instead that section
706(g) simply did not apply to consent judgments. 52
 In reaching
that conclusion, the Court relied extensively on the four factors
discussed above. Although the Court did not say that consent judg-
ments could never be challenged under Title VII or, in the case of
46
 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) (quoting
Albemarle Paper . Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)); accord United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
" E.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-07; see also 110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Geller); id. at 11,471 (remarks of Sen. Davits).
" 29 C.F.R. 1608.3 (1986).
49
 106 S. Ct. at 3063.
59 Id. at 3067-71. The Court has not been able to resolve the question whether objectors
to a consent judgment must intervene in a timely fashion in the underlying action or can
bring a separate action collaterally attacking the consent judgments. The precise issue was
before the Court in the 1987 Term, but it split 4 to 4. Marino v. Ortiz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4090
(1988), aff 'g by an equally divided court, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986).
"Section 706(g) provides in pertinent part:
[n]o order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion
of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused em-
ployment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
52 106 S. Ct. at 3072.
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a public sector employer, under the equal protection clause," the
tenor of the Court's opinion left no doubt as to its view of the
importance of promoting voluntary efforts to settle claims of dis-
crimination without extensive judicial involvement.
Although the Court's solicitude for voluntary settlements in
equal protection clause cases cannot be as extensively documented,
nothing in those decisions suggests a contrary disposition. 54 Fur-
thermore, for these Justices to endorse consent judgments entered
into by public sector employers with less enthusiasm because such
employers are subject to the equal protection clause rather than
Title VII would make very little sense. Such an approach would
simply encourage litigation, cause more court congestion, and sap
the judiciary's resources. Voluntary plans adopted in the public
sector are also likely to reflect community consensus and thus gen-
erate less opposition and hostility. Moreover, a contrary disposition
would be inconsistent with the philosophy underlying the Court's
decisions involving school desegregation, an area analogous to em-
ployment discrimination by the public sector. In school desegrega-
tion cases, the Court has always endorsed legitimate, good faith
efforts by school boards to eliminate the vestiges of discrimination. 55
In short, "voluntarism" is as much a virtue in equal protection clause
cases involving race/gender-conscious decisions by public sector em-
ployers as it is in Title VII cases.
Ironically, the policy favoring voluntary settlements turns out
to be partially responsible for the opinions' lack of cohesiveness. As
demonstrated in Parts II and III, in large measure the Court's
jurisprudential instability stems from a willingness on the part of
the Justices to forego a complete legal exegesis of certain statutory
and constitutional issues in order to preserve a majority vote. Even
where a majority of the Justices strikes down a plan, it does so in
narrow terms in an effort to cause the least disruption to the overall
policy favoring voluntary settlements.
In sum, in examining the legality of race/gender-conscious em-
ployment decisions, a majority of the Justices are mindful not only
of the specific issues before the Court, such as the plan's factual
predicate, or the employer's attempt to remedy societal discrimi-
" Id. at 3079-80.
54 E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55
 Brown v. Board of Ethic., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955); cf: Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 21 (1971).
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nation, but are also mindful of the general effect of their underlying
decision on voluntary settlements.
II. MUCH CONFUSION AND LITTLE CONSENSUS: Two ILLUSTRATIVE
ISSUES
As noted at the outset of this article, a major flaw in the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence is the absence of a solid consensus
on key issues. As a "bottom-line" matter there is often sufficient
agreement among five Justices to support or strike down a partic-
ular race/gender-conscious plan. But careful study of the opinions
reveals little or no consensus on the underlying principles that
compelled their votes. The two issues discussed below illustrate in
particular how difficult it is to pin down the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence.
A. The Factual Predicate Controversy
All members of the Court generally agree that an employer is
free to implement a race/gender-conscious program if it has some
basis for believing it has discriminated in the past. 56 The Justices
disagree, however, about what kind and quantum of statistical proof
constitute a sufficient basis for an employer to draw the conclusion
it has discriminated. Two terms, "manifest imbalance" and "prima
facie case," have surfaced again and again in the Court's opinions.
Although their precise meaning is not certain, an analysis of Weber
v. United Steelworkers of America" and Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, California," decided under Title VII, and Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education, 59 decided under the equal protection
clause, offers some guidance.
I. Title VII and the Weber formula after Johnson
The meaning of the term "manifest imbalance" cannot be di-
vorced from the factual setting of Weber, the first reverse discrimi-
nation case to reach the Court involving Title VII and the case that
'6 E.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-79 (passim) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). Based on the tenor of Justice Kennedy's decisions on the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, no reason exists to doubt justice Kennedy's agreement
with this proposition. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
57 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
59
 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
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gave birth to the term. In Weber, the Kaiser Aluminum and Chem-
ical Corporation (Kaiser) and the United Steelworkers Union of
America (USWA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement
establishing a training program to enable unskilled production
workers at various plants to qualify for craft positions. 6° Admission
to the program hinged on the applicant's race. The agreement
reserved fifty percent of the places for black employees. Thus, there
were two lists of applicants: one composed of white employees, the
other of black employees. Within each racial group, selection was
based on seniority. Because of the separate lists, Weber, a white
employee, was denied admission to the training program, while
black employees with less seniority were admitted." The Kaiser Plan
admitted eligible black employees without requiring any proof that
they had been victims of discriminatory practices by the company.
Weber challenged the collective bargaining agreement, arguing
it violated subsections (a) and (d) of section 703 of Title VII, which
made it unlawful to "discriminate . . because of ... race" in hiring
and apprenticeship programs." 2: The Supreme Court rejected that
challenge in a 5-2 decision. The opinion, written by Justice Brennan,
acknowledged that a literal construction of the statute would be
fatal to the Kaiser/USWA agreement. But the Court looked to the
"spirit of the Act" and interpreted section 703's prohibition "against
the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the his-
torical context from which the Act arose."63 Because Congress in-
tended Title VII to bring blacks into the mainstream of American
society, Justice Brennan concluded that striking clown the affirma-
tive action program "would 'bring about an end completely at var-
iance with the purpose of the statute' and must be rejected.""
6" 443 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1978).
"' Id. at 198-99.
"2 See supra note 7.
"3 443 U.S. at 201.
" Id. at 202 (quoting United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953)).
Justice Brennan's opinion has been criticized for its exclusive reliance on Title VII's 1904
legislative history because it offers very little support for the opinion's holding. Curiously,
he completely overlooked the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, which do support
the holding. Edwards, Affirmative Action or Reverse Discrimination: The Head and Tail of Weber,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713, 743-50 (1980). Justice Brennan corrected this oversight in Local
28, 106 S. Ct. at 3045-47. The correctness of the Weber decision has been a subject of fierce
debate among scholars. Compare Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validity and
Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17, 45 and Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the
Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. lbw. 423 (1980) and Walker, The
Exorbitant Cost of Redistributing Injustice: A Critical View of United States Steelworkers v. Weber
and the Misguided Policy of Numerical Employment, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1079) with Belton, Discrint-
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Central to Justice Brennan's analysis was his conclusion that
the Kaiser/USWA agreement was designed "to eliminate conspicu-
ous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." 65
Although the Court did not extensively analyze the meaning of the
language "conspicuous racial imbalance," it was clearly referring to
the significant statistical disparity between the percentage of minor-
ity workers actually employed by Kaiser and the percentage avail-
able in the local labor poo1. 66 A bare 1.83% of Kaiser's skilled
craftworkers were black, although the local work force was approx-
imately 39% black. 67
Contrary to the Hazelwood principle that for jobs demanding
specialized skills, reliance on general labor pool statistics was im-
proper, 68 the Court readily accepted the validity of this statistical
comparison. A comparison more consistent with Hazelwood would
have looked to the percentage of qualified blacks in the labor pool.
After all, how could Kaiser conclude that it faced potential Title
VII liability if there were no or very few qualified blacks to hire in
the first. place? The difficulties associated with this question may
have been the impetus for the Court's appendage of the "tradition-
ally segregated job categories" language.
The Weber Court, in selecting that phraseology, was acutely
conscious that at the Kaiser plant and at almost all the other plants
in the deep South, blacks had no chance of obtaining the skills
necessary for craft jobs because of employer and union discrimi-
nation. 6° Furthermore, the problem of hiring a qualified skilled
black craftworker rarely presented itself because of the poor quality
of segregated schools. Just as Brown v. Board of Education" and its
progeny were directed to dismantling the educational disabilities
that flowed from segregated schools, Weber was clearly directed to
dismantling the employment barriers blacks faced throughout the
South.
Not all the Justices in the majority supported the "racial im-
balance in traditionally segregated job categories" test. Justice Black-
motion and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L.
REV. 531 (1981) and Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment After Weber, 34 RUTGERS L.
Rev. 1 (1981). See also Boyd, Affirmative Action in Employment — The Weber Decision, 66 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1080).
65 443 U.S. at 209.
"6 Id. at 208-09; id. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 198-99.
1 "' Sec supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
69 443 U.S. at 198 n.1,202-05.
7 " 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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mun in a concurring opinion, echoes of which will be heard in later
opinions by other Justices, stated that he preferred the "arguable
violation" approach. Under this more restrictive theory, an em-
ployer could implement a race/gender-conscious program only if it
had evidence rising to the level of an "arguable violation" of the
statute.n This theory was more demanding than the manifest im-
balance test but less strenuous than Hazelwood's requirement of a
prima facie case for liability.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California
involved a Title VII affirmative action program of a very different
character. In Johnson, the defendant, a county transportation
agency, had unilaterally adopted an affirmative action plan for
women, minorities, and handicapped persons based on a statistical
imbalance between its work force and the general labor pool. A key
provision of the plan provided that in making promotions to jobs
within traditionally segregated job categories, the selecting official
could take race, gender, or disability into consideration. Unlike
Weber's 50/50 selection criteria, the plan did not contain fixed ratios
or percentages. Gender was simply a "plus." 72
One of the skilled craft jobs subject to the affirmative action
plan was that of a road dispatcher. The position involved assigning
road crews, equipment, and materials and record keeping. No
woman had ever held this position; nor did the gender composition
of the road crews subject to the dispatcher's discretion reflect the
percentage of available women in the area's labor force." Following
agency procedures, the job was posted and ultimately seven appli-
cants were certified as eligible for selection by the appointing offi-
cial. Although the appointing official was free to select any one of
the seven, the applicants were ranked. First on the list was Johnson,
a male. His overall score was 75. Second on the promotion list was
Joyce, a female with a score of 73. 74 Joyce contacted the agency's
affirmative action coordinator who, in turn, recommended to the
selecting official that Joyce be promoted in keeping with the affir-
71 443 U.S. al 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring), See infra notes 150-51 and accom-
panying text. Although she does not explicitly say so, Justice O'Connor appears to have
adopted this approach in cases brought under the fourteenth amendment challenging race/
gender-conscious employment decisions in the public sector. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856-57
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). See infra note 246 and accompanying
text.
72 107 S. Ct, 1442,1447 (1987).
" Id. at 1453.
" Id. at 1948.
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mative action plan. According to the selecting official; after
"look[ing] at the whole picture, the combination of her qualifications
and Mr. Johnson's qualifications, their test scores, their expertise,
their background, affirmative action matters, things like that . . . ,"
the selecting official chose Joyce.'"
Johnson filed a Title VII action. The district court ruled in his
favor, holding that. the county's affirmative action plan did not
satisfy Weber. 76 Also relying on Weber, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed. 77 The Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals decision in an opinion which significantly altered the
Weber formula. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined. Justice
O'Connor concurred solely in the judgment and, as explained be-
low, filed a concurring opinion, adopting a significantly more re-
strictive approach to the establishment of a factual predicate under
Title VII.
The Johnson majority's analysis of the "manifest racial balance"
test enunciated in Weber proceeded in . three stages. The first stage
examined the relevant labor pool. Although the Court reaffirmed
the Hazelwood principle that if a job requires special expertise, the
labor pool must reflect the percentage of persons qualified for the
job," the Court approved the county's use of general population
figures because the feeder positions that qualified an employee for
the road dispatcher job required no special expertise."
The second stage of the "manifest racial balance" Lest examined
the degree of gender disparity between the county's work force and
the relevant labor pool. Because of the stark disparity between the
gender composition of the general labor pool and the county's work
force — all of the agency's 238 skilled craft positions were held by
men, the third stage of the analysis was remarkably uncomplicated.
Given the total exclusion of women and given that Joyce was qual-
ified for the road dispatcher position, Justice Brennan concluded
that the county's affirmative action plan satisfied the first Weber
requirement of being designed to eliminate a manifest imbalance. 8°
To viewjohnson simply as a reaffirmation of Weber in the context
of gender discrimination is misleading. With minimal explanation,
75 Id.
76
 107 S. Ct. at 1449 (1987). The district court's decision is unreported.
77 748 F.2d 1308,1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
7, 107 S. Ct. at 1452.
76 cy: id. at 1452-56 (passim).
"0 Id. at 1454-56.
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the majority opinion altered the Weber formula in two significant
respects, a fact that was not lost on Justice O'Connor in her con-
curring opinion nor on Justice White in his dissenting opinion. The
first alteration consisted of the collapsing of the second part of the
Weber formula, "in traditionally segregated job categories," into the first
part, "manifest imbalance." As noted earlier, Weber was a case whose
holding cannot be divorced from its factual setting of systemic
employment discrimination and educational segregation in the deep
South. In the Kaiser plant, the skilled jobs were white jobs and the
labor jobs were black jobs. As Justice Brennan observed in Weber:
"The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute, Both were
designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hi-
erarchy. Both were structured to 'open employment opportunities
for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them.""
In fashioning the Weber formula, the Court was certainly aware
of the far reaching implications of its decision. The Kaiser plan was
not an original proposal. It was modeled on a massive, nationwide
settlement between the Department of justice and the steel industry
which literally opened up tens of thousands of jobs and training
opportunities for blacks.82 By putting a judicial imprimatur on the
Kaiser plan, the Court was in effect endorsing the steel settlement
and purposefully putting a powerful tool in the hands of the federal
government, aggrieved employees, and private employers.
The segregation in Johnson resulted from societal norms of a
very different nature: women did office work; men did manual
labor. Although Justice Brennan could properly buttress the hold-
ing in Weber by asserting that Congress's principal goal in enacting
Title VII was to bring blacks into the mainstream of the American
economy, Congress had no similar goal for women in 1964. "Sex"
was inserted into Title VII as a proscribed basis for discrimination
by opponents of the bill who hoped to insure its defeat by the
81 443 U.S at 208 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
82 Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The settlement resolved charges of racial and
sexual discrimination against nine of the nation's largest steel companies and resulted in a
sweeping overhaul of the industry's employment practices and in back pay awards of over
$30 million dollars to approximately 50,000 minority workers. United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975); Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment
After Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 6-7 n.13 (1981). Provisions similar to the KaiserlUSWA
agreement were also included in the union's contracts with Reynolds Metals and ALCOA,
the other two major American aluminum producers. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Chem.
Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 229 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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inclusion. 83 Although undoubtedly the victims of employment dis-
crimination if they sought access to jobs traditionally held by men,
women never constituted the kind of economic underclass blacks
did In the South. Nonetheless, Justice Brennan's opinion for the
majority treats their exclusion from manual labor positions as an
exclusion of the same character as the exclusion of blacks from
skilled trade jobs in the South.
Although one can applaud this extension of Weber from a social
perspective, it remains a troubling flaw in Justice Brennan's analysis.
The reality of johnsoh is that the five-Justice majority recast the
Weber formula in a significantly different manner without acknowl-
edging the change. The factual predicate is now "statistical imbal-
ance" without more.
A second and equally disturbing alteration of the Weber formula
consists in the Court's reduction of the quantum of proof needed
as a factual predicate by a public sector employer before imple-
menting a voluntary race/gender-conscious program. Justice Bren-
nan's opinion clearly rejects any suggestion that a "manifest imbal-
ance" is synonymous with a "prima facie" case. Thus, something
less than Hazelwood's, "[e]vidence of long-standing and gross dis-
parity between the composition of a work force and that of the
general population," satisfies Weber." The open question, of course,
is how much less?
The value offohnson's factual predicate analysis is further weak-
ened by the character of Justice O'Connor's vote. Although she cast
the sixth vote in support of the gender-conscious plan, Justice
O'Connor declined to join Justice Brennan's opinion because it
followed "an expansive and ill-defined approach to voluntary affir-
mative action." 85 Her more guarded approach rested on a synthesis
of Weber and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, discussed below.
Insisting that no valid justification existed for different standards
under Title VII and the fourteenth amendment, she opted for a
prima facie predicate, a position much like the "arguable violation"
taken by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Weber. 86
83 Ironically, Title Vll's inclusion of women as a protected group resulted from the
attempts of Southern Congressmen to defeat the bill. 110 Conic,. Rec. 2577-84 (1964); C. &
B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
124-217 (passim) (1985).
84
 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
" 107 S. Ct. at 1461 (O'Connor, j., concurring in the judgment).
86 Id. at 1461-63. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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In sum, simply because six Justices voted in favor of the gender-
conscious plan in Johnson does not mean that the validity of other
gender-conscious plans is guaranteed. Justice Powell's retirement
diminishes the support by one vote. Justice Stevens continues to
believe Weber was wrongly decided in the first place." justice O'Con- •
nor explicitly disagrees with the majority's new formulation.
2. The Equal Protection Clause and Wygant
The Court first interpreted the meaning of the equal protection
clause in the context of reverse discrimination claims in two cases
that did not involve employment. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, a highly splintered Court struck down a special
admissions program at the medical school of the University of Cal-
ifornia at Davis which exclusively reserved 16 seats for minority-
group applicants. Five Justices, however, agreed that the state could
at a minimum consider race as a "plus" in conferring benefits." In
Fullilove v. Klutznick, a majority of the Justices agreed that Congress
could set aside 10 percent of the funds appropriated under the
Public Works Act of 1977 for minority business enterprises."
A close reading of Bakke and Fullilove suggests that all the
Justices except Justice Rehnquist agreed that the equal protection
clause did not prohibit the use of race-conscious criteria in a vol-
untary remedial context. Whether read singly or in tandem, neither
case offered more than general guidance to a public sector employer
considering implementing a race/gender-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plan. At best, three principles could be gleaned from the two
cases. First, exclusively reserving a specific number of new hire slots
or promotions for minority-group members would most likely vio-
late the equal protection clause. Second, using race as a "plus," but
not the determinant factor in employment decisions, was probably
safe. Third, the Court would defer to Congress's judgment that
race/gender-conscious remedial action was necessary to correct
prior discrimination.
Neither Bakke nor Fullilove examined race-conscious employ-
ment decisions directly. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, decided
in 1986, was the first pure employment case to reach the Court
" 107 S. Ct. at 1458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8" 438 U.S. at 272,315-20 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 326,355-79 (opinion of Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and White, J.).
'9 448 U.S. at 472-92 (opinion of Burger C.J., joined by White, J., and Powell, J.); id. at
517-22 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J.).
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involving an equal protection clause challenge to a voluntarily
adopted program. Just as Kaiser was prompted to develop its race-
conscious training program in Weber because the federal govern-
ment had found serious fault with its hiring and promotion policies,
the Jackson School Board in Wygant aggressively began to recruit
minority teachers, following the issuance of a complaint by the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission in 1969. 9° Although the recruit-
ment proved quite successful — the percentage of minority teachers
increased dramatically within two years from 3.9% to 8.8% — those
gains were later wiped out when economic conditions precipitated
faculty layoffs. 9 t The newly hired minority teachers bore the brunt
of the layoffs because the collective bargaining agreement mandated
dismissal in reverse order of seniority."
Shortly after the layoffs, racial violence erupted in the schools.
After difficult negotiations, the School Board and the teachers'
Union amended the collective bargaining agreement to protect mi-
nority teachers' job security. The new provision, Article XII, estab-
lished a dismissal mechanism whereby in the event of a layoff,
teachers with the most seniority would be retained except that at
no time would the percentage of minority personnel laid off be
greater than the percentage of minority personnel existing at the
time of the layoff."
9°
 106 S. Ct. at 1858-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 1859.
92 Id. at 1843-45.
93 Article XI I provided as follows:
In the event that it becosnes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through
layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most seniority in the
district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage
of minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel
employed at the time of the layoff. In no event will the number given notice of
possible layoff be greater than the number of positions to be eliminated. Each
teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order For positions for which
he is certificated maintaining the above minority balance.
Id. at 1845. "Minority Personnel" were defined in another provision as "those employees who
are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish descendancy." Id. at 1845 n.2.
It has been observed that modification of seniority to preserve gains in minority em-
ployment is "by no means uncommon in public education," Brief for the National Education
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 & n.2, Wygant v. Jackson ad.
of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 184'2 (1986), citing a number of collective bargaining agreements
throughout the United States. If the Supreme Court had held that a prior legislative, judicial,
or administrative finding of discrimination were necessary, such a holding would have thrown
affirmative action programs across the country into total chaos, and possibly exposed the
states to significant financial loss. Certainly, there would have been a tidal wave of litigation.
Over 26 million individuals are employed by the federal government and the states. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1986 294 (10112 ed. 1985).
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Subsequently, the School Board refused to adhere to the terms
of the contract because compliance would have meant laying off
Affirmative action programs using race-conscious criteria exist in just about every stare.
E.g., See ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.19.444-44.19.445 (1985), and Alaska Admin. Order No. 59,
reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:225; Arizona Exec. Order No. 83.5, reported
in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:436; CAI.. GOVT CODE §§ 19400-19406, 19790-
19798 (West 1980); Cal. Exec. Orders Nos. B-85.8I and D-20-83, reported in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:853, and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, Rule 7286.8, reprinted in 8A Fair
Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:862; Cow. ADMIN. Cone § 1-6-1, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1039; Cow. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-2-4 and 5-6-1 et seq., reprinted in 8A
Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1105; CoLo. ADMIN. CODE § 80.9, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac. Man, (BNA) 453:1128, and Cow. ADMIN. Cone § 90.13, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 453:1157; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-68 (West Supp. 1985), and Conn. Exec.
Order No. 9, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (RNA) 453:1246; Del. Exec, Orders Nos.
74, 81, and 102, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1446; D.C. CODE § 1-2524
(1981); D.C. Cone §§ 1-507-1-511 and I-1141-1-1151 (1981); FLA. SW. ANN. § 110.112
(West 1982), and Fla. Exec, Order No. 79-50, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA)
453:1827; Ga. Exec. Order dated July 29, 1976, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA)
453:2051; Hawaii Exec, Order No. 77,4 and Admin. Directive 80-2, reported in 8A Fair EMI).
Pose. Man, (BNA) 453:2259, and HAWAII EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REGULATIONS
§§ 12-31-1-12-31-7 reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:2351-56; ILL. Dei"r or
HUMAN RIGHTS PROCEDURAL & PUBLIC CONTRACT RULES, §§ 750.110-170 (1984) reported in
8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:2711; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-15-12.1 et seq. (Supp. 1985);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 240, Chapters 8.1(1) et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA)
453:3091, and IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 240, Chapters 20.1 et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac.
Man, (BNA) 453:3151; KAN. ADMIN. KEGS. 21-30-14 et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Einp, Prac.
Man. (BNA) 453:3306; Ky. Rev. STAT. §§ 45.550-45.640 (1980), arid Ky. Exec. Orders Nos.
80.106 and 84-549, reported in 8A Fair Emp. i'rac. Man. (BNA) 455:74; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
Lk. 5, §§ 781-790 (1979); Mn. ANN. Cone art. 78A, 7A (1977), and Md. Exec. Order dated
December 9, 1970, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:655; Mass. Exec. Orders
Nos, 227 and 237, reported in 8A Fair Enip. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:883-84 and Mass. Equal
Employment Opportunity Anti-Discrimination arid Affirmative Action Program (Admin.
Bull. 75.14), reprinted in 3A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:961; Mimi. COMP, LAWS ANN,
§ 37.2210 (West 1985), Mich. Exec. Order 1983-4, reported in BA Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA)
455:1030, and Mich. Civil Rts. Div. Directive dated April 1978, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac, Man. (BNA) 455:1132; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.19 (West Supp. 1985), and Minn.
Dep't. of human Rights Regulations, ch. 5000, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp, Prac. Man. (BNA)
455:1301; Miss. State Personnel Board Manual of Policies, Rules 5.10 et seq., reprinted in 8A
Fair Einp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1505; Mo. Exec. Order No. 82-27, reported in SA Fair Etlip.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1643, and Mo. Anmix. CODE (8 CSR) 60-3.080, reprinted in 8A Fair
Eng). Prat:. Man. (BNA) 455:1715; Mont, Exec. Order No. 24-81, reported in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1845; NEB. REY. STAT. §§ 81-1355 et seq. (1981), and Neb. Exec. Order
dated June 16, 1978, reported in 8A Fair Einp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2048; Nev. Exec. Order
dated February 23, 1983, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2226; N.H. Exec.
Order 81-3, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Mali. (BNA) 455:2436, arid N.H. State Plan for
Equal Employment in Apprenticeship and Training, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man,
(BNA) 455:2531-2543; N.j. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-34 (West 1976), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 11:2d-1 et
seq. (West Supp. 1985), NJ. Exec. Order No 61, reported in 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCII)
25,722; N.M. Exec. Order 81-45, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2849, and
N,M. Human Rts. Commission Regulations §§ XIII-X1V, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 455:2881-83; N.Y. Exec, Law § 296 (12) (Consol. 1982), N.Y. Exec. Orders
30	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1
tenured teachers while retaining probationary minority teachers.
The Union challenged the refusal in two separate actions. In the
first case, commenced in federal court, the Union asserted that the
it , Board's breach violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and Title VII. In its answer, the Board specifi-
cally denied any prior discrimination in employment. The district
court never reached this defense, however, because it sua sponte
dismissed the complaint."
The Union won the second case, commenced in state court,
when the court ordered enforcement of the layoff provision. In so
doing, however, the state court concluded that "no history of overt
past discrimination" existed, that discrimination against minorities
"ha[d] not been established," and that the absence of minority teach-
ers "was the result of societal racial discrimination." 95 In holding
Nos. 6 and 21, reported in 8A Fair Enip. Prac. Man (BNA) 455:3071-73, and N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 9, § 466, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:3125; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.04(A)(10) (Baldwin Supp. 1979), Ohio Exec. Order dated September 13, 1973,
reported in 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 11 26,715, Ohio Dept of State Personnel Rules and
Regulations, ch. 123: 1-49-01 et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Enip. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:231,
Ohio Bureau of Equal Employment Opportunity for Construction Regulations, ch. 123:2-3-
01 et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:282, and Ohio State Apprenticeship
Council Rules 4101:1-5-02 et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:307; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 840.25 (West Supp. 1985), and Okla. Exec. Order No. 79-14, reported in
8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:425; Oit. REV. STAT. §§ 182.100, 243.305, 243.315, and
659.025 (1983), Or. Exec. Order 79-22, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 45:709,
and OR. ADMIN. R. 839-11-200, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:693; Pa.
Exec. Order 1984-1, reported in 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 11 27,251, Regulations of Penn.
Human Rights Commission §§ 49.51 et seq., reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA)
457:889, Regulations of Penn. Dep't of Labor and Industry, Industrial Board, §§ 81.1 et seq.,
reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:935, Affirmative Action Guidelines of the
Penn. Human Relations Commission, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:851,
and Penn. Employee Selection Guidelines § 15 (1 Pa. Admin. Bull. 2359 (1971)), reprinted in
8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:861; R.I. Exec. Order 85-11, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:1245; S.D. ADMIN, R. 65-20 et seq„ reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 457:SD1751; 'PENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-3, (1985) and Tenn. Exec. Order No. 8,
reported in 8A Fair Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:1865; Tex. Exec. Order MW-6, reported in 8A Fair
Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2007; Utah Exec. Order dated May 4, 1979, reported in 8A Fair
Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2218; Va. Exec. Order No. 1-86, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 457:2626; Wash. Exec. Order No. 85-09, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 457:2826, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.04.100-49.04.130 (1974), reprinted in 8A Fair Emp.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2873-74, WASH. ADMIN. CODE 168-08-298(4)(g), reprinted in 8A Fair
Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2912, WASH. ADMIN. CODE 168-18-011-168-18-100, reprinted in
8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2928a-28h, and WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296-04-300-296-
04-480, reprinted in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2970; W. Va. Order 16-78 reported
in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:3026; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.765 and 230.01 et seq.
(West Supp. 1985), and Wis. Exec. Order Nos. 9, 26, and 28, reported in 8A Fair Emp. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 457:3217-18.
"4
 106 S. Ct. at 1845.
IS Id.
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that Article XII did not violate Title VII, the state court upheld the
modification of the seniority agreement as an attempt to remedy
the effects of societal discrimination. 96 The Board's answer denying
discrimination and the state court's finding of no discrimination
would later prove significant in the Supreme Court's resolution of
the factual predicate issue.
In 1981, non-minority teachers challenged the constitutional
validity of Article XII. 97
 In rejecting the plaintiffs' challenge, both
the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
addressed the factual predicate issue. The statistical evidence relied
upon by the district court compared the percentage of minority
teachers to the percentage of minority students in the student body,
not to the percentage of minority teachers in the relevant labor
market." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit approved the
statistics' use in a cursory fashion, emphasizing "the school board's
interests in eliminating historic discrimination, promoting racial
harmony in the community and providing role-models for minority
students ... ."99
The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 5-4. Justice Powell
wrote a plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined. Justice O'Connor joined parts of the plurality
opinion and wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and in the
judgment. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. The absence of a majority opinion and the presence of the
two concurring opinions contribute to the opinion's jurisprudential
instability a far greater instability than the majority's narrow
margin suggests.
The factual predicate issue came before the Court in a some-
what convoluted fashion, arising in the context of Justice Powell's
un ld.
U7
 546 F. Supp. at 1195 (E.D. Midi. 1982), The teachers also raised claims resting on
Title VII, certain civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985, and several Michigan
statutes. Id. at 1199. The district court dismissed the Title VII allegations because the
plaintiffs had failed to file an administrative claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a Title VII action. Id. at 1203. It
dismissed the section 1981, 1983 and 1985 claims because, on the merits of plaintiffs'
constitutional claim, it had ruled that the layoff provision was valid. Finally, it dismissed the
state law claims because it had dismissed the federal claims. Id. at 1203-04.
Id. at 1201-02. The district court reasoned: "['Teaching is more than just a job.
Teachers are role-models for their students. More specifically, minority teachers are role-
models for minority students. This is vitally important because societal discrimination has
often deprived minority children of other role-models." Id. at 1201.
99
 746 F.2d at 1157.
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application of the strict scrutiny test to the layoff procedure. Con-
sistent with his opinions in Bakke'°° and Fullilove,'°' Justice Powell
maintained that government action triggered by racial criteria must
be subjected to a "searching examination." He insisted that "[f]irst,
any racial classification 'must be justified by a compelling govern-
ment interest. . ..' Second, the means chosen by the State to effec-
tuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal."'°2
Justice Powell's opinion emphatically rejected the "role-model"
justification" advanced by the district court and the court of ap-
peals, both of which viewed the modified layoff procedure as a
means of providing role-models to minority children for the pur-
pose of alleviating societal discrimination. 104
The School Board also claimed, as a fallback position, that it
adopted the layoff provision to remedy prior hiring discrimina-
tion. 105 While declining to examine the specific facts advanced by
the School Board as proof of discrimination because of the chaotic
state of the record, Justice Powell very pointedly discussed what
kind of factual predicate would insulate a public employer's affir-
mative action plan from a successful constitutional challenge by non-
minority employees: 106 "In particular, a public employer like the
Board must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative action
program, it has convincing evidence that remedial action is war-
ranted. That is, it must have sufficient evidence to justify the con-
clusion that there has been prior discrimination." 1 °7 Essentially, the
plurality opinion reaffirmed Hazelwood's Title VII liability analysis
discussed earlier. 108 Significantly, Justice Powell extended it to equal
protection clause claims involving voluntary race-conscious plans.'"
In Justice Powell's view, had the School Board demonstrated a
statistically significant disparity between the percentage of minority
school teachers hired and the percentage available in the labor pool,
it would have been able to show "a strong basis in evidence for its
100 438 U.S. at 287-91.
101 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring).
102 106 S. Ct. at 1846.
103 Id. at 1847.
104 546 F. Supp. at 1201; 746 F.2d at 1156-57.
105 106 S. Ct. at 1849 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 1858-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106 1d. at 1847-48 (opinion of Powell, J.).
10, Id. at 1848.
ID8 Id. at 1847-48.
1 " Id.
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conclusion that remedial action was necessary." 10 The record, how-
ever, did not contain such proof. Ultimately, a majority of the
Justices in Wygant held the layoff provision was unconstitutional
because "as a means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise may
be legitimate, the Board's layoff plan is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored. Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar pur-
poses — such as the adoption of hiring goals — are available."'"
The major difficulty with the plurality opinion's reliance on
Hazelwood lies in its avoidance of the firm rule of actual and pur-
poseful intent laid down in Washington v. Davis."' As discussed
earlier, that case flatly rejected impact as proof of discrimination.
Although the Court in Washington v. Davis and subsequent cases did
not dismiss impact as irrelevant," 3 it never diminished the impor-
tance of intent as the sine qua non of an equal protection clause
violation. In looking to Hazelwood, the four Justices in the Wygant
plurality were clearly saying that whatever evidence satisfies Title
VII's impact theory will also provide sufficient proof that "the em-
ployer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial
action was necessary." 4
The principle that satisfying the burden of proof associated
with Title VII's impact theory also provides a satisfactory factual
predicate for a voluntary plan under the equal protection clause
drew the support of the three dissenting Justices as well. Although
the dissenters did not address the factual predicate issue directly,
their earlier opinions, especially in Bakke and Fullilove, leave no
doubt that they would endorse this principle. 15 Unlike the Justices
in the plurality opinion, however, they refuse to accept "strong
evidence" as a limiting principle in fashioning an acceptable factual
predicate for remedial purposes.
Wygant is a case in which a scorecard tallying up the Justices'
votes tells very little about its true significance. A scorecard would
simply show that a majority of the Justices voted to strike clown the
layoff provision, apparently agreeing that it was not sufficiently
1  Id. at 1848.
Id. at 1852.
" 2 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text,
Hs 926 U.S. 229 (1976).
I 0
 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
Fullilove, 998 U.S. at 457-73 (opinion of Burger, C.J., in which White, J., joined); id,
at 517-22 (opinion of Marshall, J., in which Brennan, J., Powell, J., and Blackmun, „ joined);
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 355-62 (opinion of Brennan, J., in which Marshall, J., White, J., and
Blackmun, J., joined).
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narrowly tailored. What it overlooks is that eight of the Justices (1)
endorsed race-conscious hiring and promotion criteria in voluntary
affirmative action programs in the public sector, (2) confirmed that
a judicial, administrative, or legislative finding of discrimination was
not a constitutionally required factual predicate, and (3) agreed on
a "minimum floor" for an acceptable factual predicate, to wit, sta-
tistical evidence of a disparate impact resembling Hazelwood's.
Unfortunately, their consensus disintegrated upon further con-
sideration of the factual predicate issue. Key questions remain un-
answered. How great an imbalance is needed to show "evidence of
long-lasting and gross disparity" between the race or gender com-
position of the employer's work force and that of the local labor
pool? Is the need for a racially diverse and gender-balanced faculty
an acceptable predicate for an affirmative action plan? If either
need is, can other employers in different settings make a similar
claim?
3. Are Johnson and Wygant Really Saying the Same Thing?
After Weber and Johnson on the one hand, and Wygant, on the
other, a public sector employer wanting to implement an affirmative
action program has two questions to ponder: under Title VII; is
there a "manifest imbalance in traditionally segregated job cate-
gories," and under the equal protection clause, is there "a strong
basis in evidence" resembling Hazelwood's to conclude that it has
engaged in prior discriminatory conduct? As noted above, a per-
suasive argument can be constructed that Johnson has made the
"traditionally segregated job categories" prong of the Weber formula
essentially irrelevant. An additional argument can be made that
Wygant's "strong basis in evidence" is simply reformulation of Weber's
"conspicuous imbalance." In both cases, the Court used the two
formulae to direct a comparison between the racial or gender com-
position of the employer's work force and the labor pool from which
it drew its employees. In both cases, the formulae strongly suggest
that impact alone protects an employer's decision to implement a
race/gender-conscious program.
Despite this common bond between the two sets of cases, a
subtle tension arises from their differing approaches to the concept
of the appropriate labor pool. In Wygant, both general population
figures and minority pupil ratios were hardly relevant to deciding
the availability of qualified minority teachers. The Court's insistence
upon reference to "the racial composition of the qualified public
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school teacher population in the relevant labor market"" 6 had an
unmistakable ring of common sense to it. A school district cannot
be expected to hire minority teachers if none are available. On the
other hand, if the Court in Weber had looked to the percentage of
qualified black craftworkers in the skilled labor pool surrounding
the Kaiser plant, the "conspicuous imbalance" would have dimin-
ished, if not disappeared entirely. Similar arguments existed in
Johnson given the very small percentage of women in the skilled
labor pool and the low employee turnover.
Why the difference in approach between Weber and folznson, on
the one hand, and Wygant, on the other? Admittedly, the Court's
analysis can be faulted from a strictly logical perspective. On an
intuitive level, however, it does not seem unreasonable. On a prac-
tical level, it seems compelling.
The Court's analysis in each case produced a rough justice.
After Weber, Kaiser was free to conduct a training program, en-
abling unskilled blacks and whites to improve their economic status
and qualify for significantly higher paying jobs. The Court's deci-
sion in no way compelled or even encouraged Kaiser to promote
unskilled or less than qualified employees into these jobs. If the
Court had required the racial composition of the training program
to mirror the racial composition of the labor pool of qualified craf-
tworkers, the Court would have allowed the skilled trades positions
at the Kaiser plant to remain virtually all white. The use of straight
seniority as the determining, criterion for eligibility would have
severely limited the entry of blacks. At best, their entry into the
skilled trades positions would have progressed in slow, incremental
steps. The Kaiser 50/50, white/black ratio accelerated the main-
streaming of blacks into the American economy, which was, after
all, the overriding goal of Congress in enacting Title VII. Although
Congress had no similar, expressed goal with respect to women in
enacting Title VII in 1964, certainly Congress's amendments in
1972 and its failure to disapprove any of the Court's gender-dis-
crimination decisions justify extending the Weber rationale to women
in Johnson.
On the other hand, the Court would have affirmatively frus-
trated the goal of integrating blacks and women into the mainstream
of the American economy in Wygant if it had permitted a compar-
ison based on the general population statistics or minority pupil
11° 106 S. Ct. at 1847 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308).
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ratio. The obvious result would have been a hiring of minorities
for the sake of numbers. Quality and competence would have suf-
fered. This result, in turn, would have certainly fueled public resis-
tance to affirmative action and increased racial friction.
B. Beyond the Factual Predicate: Societal Discrimination as a
Justification for RacelGender-Conscious Employment Decisions
One of the problems that has plagued the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence since its inception has been the treatment of
societal discrimination, i.e., discrimination by institutions over which
the employer has no control, such as schools, other employers, and
unions. As a general observation, it is fair to say American law,
whether judge-made or statutory, federal or state, centers on the
concept of individual liability.'" A defendant is under no obligation
to correct any wrong except one of its doing. Correspondingly, a
plaintiff can obtain no relief unless it has been a victim of the
defendant's wrongdoing. To some extent the Court has completely
departed from this second observation by interpreting Title VII as
permitting relief for non-victims. A brief mention of three cases will
illustrate this point. In Weber, the Court permitted a private em-
ployer to adopt a voluntary plan benefitting non-victims. " 8 In Local
28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, it held
that section 706(g) did not prevent a district court from ordering
I " See R. POUND, OUTLINES OP LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 96 (5th ed. 1943). For a
spirited defense of "group" interests as a justification for imposing liability, see Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term — Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). See generally Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L.
REV, 331 (1958); Cowan, The Impact of Social Security on the Philosophy of Law: The Protection of
Interests Based on Group Membership, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 688 (1957); Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. Ctn. L. REV. 235, 240-44 (1979); Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time
Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1974); Greenberg, Race Relations and Group Interest in the Law, 13 RtrrcEas
L. REV. 503 (1959); Horowitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemma of Liberalism, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979); Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in
a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006 (1984).
For criticism of the "group" theory, see Cowan, Inverse Discrimination, 33 ANALYSIS 10,
12 (1972); Goldman, Limits to the Justification of Discrimination, 3 Soc. THEORY & Pit.4c. 289
(1975); see also Taylor, Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice, 33 ANALYSIS 177 (1973).
See generally Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77
CoLum. L. REV. 866 (1977).
1 " 443 U.S. 193 (1978).
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relief benefitting individuals who were not themselves the actual
victims of discrimination."'" In City of Cleveland, it removed a consent
judgment containing such relief from the possibility of any section
706(g) objection. 120
The Court has shown less willingness to depart from the first
observation, however. The doctrine that an employer remains re-
sponsible only for correcting its own discrimination is firmly estab-
lished under Title VII and the equal protection clause. This premise
underlies the entire factual predicate controversy. How much, and
what kind of, information are necessary before an employer is free
to conclude that it has discriminated in the past?
On occasion, however, an employer may conclude that the race/
gender imbalance in its work force is not of its own doing. Neither
intentional disparate treatment nor unintentional disparate impact
has caused the imbalance. The only factual predicate upon which
the employer can rely in such an instance is the disparate treatment
and disparate impact of institutions over which it has no control,
e.g., schools, other employers, and unions.
An illustration will help to focus the question. In Hazelwood,
the school district argued that the percentage of minority teachers
in its work force was less than the percentage in the area's labor
pool because a nearby school district with higher salaries, better
working conditions, and more benefits aggressively recruited mi-
nority teachers.' 2 ' If this explanation was correct, then the small
percentage of minority teachers in the work force was not traceable
to a violation of either Title VII or the fourteenth amendment.
Assume the correctness of the school district's position, but also
assume that in response to steadily increasing minority enrollment,
the district decides to adopt a race-conscious hiring and promotion
plan. Can it lawfully do so? This illustration is not purely hypo-
thetical. In some northern states, school districts have implemented
a teacher assignment system that sets the percentage of minority
and non-minority teachers in each school without regard to prior
discrimination. 122
1 ",' 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
NU 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
111 Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299, 310-13 (1977).
' 12 See Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1107 (1985); Caulfield v. Board of Ethic., 632 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Zaslawsky v. Board of Educ., 610 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1979).
The issue of race/gender-conscious hiring and promotion can arise in other public
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The difficulty with the Court's decisions in this area is their
lack of coherent vision. Two aspects of the Court's jurisprudence
are particularly unsettling. The first is its inability to reach a con-
sensus concerning the remediation of societal discrimination under
the equal protection clause. The second is its unwillingness to ac-
knowledge that Title VII's disparate impact theory of liability is
premised upon societal discrimination — not employer discrimi-
nation.
1. Societal Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause
In Bakke, the medical school adopted its special admissions
program in part to compensate for years of societal discrimination,
which limited the access of minority group members to higher
education. This societal discrimination, in turn, deprived minority
children of much needed role-models. Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
Marshall, and White readily accepted the remediation of societal
discrimination as an 'Important government interest." 125 Relying
heavily on sociological data showing the long-standing exclusion of
blacks from the medical profession and the still lingering effects of
segregated schooling, the so-called "Brennan" group Justices lauded
the medical school's efforts to overcome the debilitating residuum
of years of unequal treatment.
Justice Powell rejected that position, fearful that its acceptance
would lead to a parceling out of government benefits "to whatever
groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination . . . a step
we have never approved." 124 At the same time, however, Justice
Powell distinguished remediation of societal discrimination from
the state's compelling interest in the promotion of a racially diverse
student body. The issue of the constitutionality of state efforts to
remedy societal discrimination ultimately remained unresolved in
employment contexts as well. The courts have generally agreed that such relief is necessary
to assist law enforcement agencies in their operational needs. See Talbert v. City of Richmond,
648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2c1671, 695 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc,. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
CONFRONTING RACIAL ISOLATION IN MIAMI 290, 326-27, 332-39 (1982); U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVII, RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES 5 (1981);
Note, Race As An Employment Qualification to Meet Police Department Operational Needs, 54 N.Y.U.
L. Ray. 413 (1979).
12 ' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357-62 (opinion of Brennan, 1).
114 Id. at 310 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Bakke because the four Justices in the so-called "Stevens" group
rested their opinion on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds. 125
Until Wygant in 1986, the Court did not have another oppor-
tunity to consider the issue of societal discrimination and the em-
ployment-related role-model justification for race/gender-conscious
affirmative action programs. In Fullilove, the Court accepted the
United States' position that the MBE provision was remedying prior
government discrimination in contracting.' 2" In United States v. Para-
dise, the district court imposed a one-for-one promotion quota to
remedy Alabama's deliberate exclusion of blacks from state trooper
jobs.'" Wygant, on the other hand, squarely presented the issue of
remedying societal discrimination because the Jackson School
Board's primary justification for Article XII was the need to retain
minority teachers as role models in order to alleviate the effects of
societal discrimination. Justice Powell's plurality opinion, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, rejected that
justification: "This Court never has held that societal discrimination
alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court
has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit. involved before allowing limited use of racial
classification in order to remedy such discrimination." 128
Justice Powell's emphatic rejection of the role-model theory
rested on several different fears. First, the theory had "no logical
stopping point" and would have required year-to-year calibrations
of the sort the Court had eschewed in other cases. Second, the
theory had the potential to justify Brown-like segregation based on
the idea that black students were better off with black teachers.
Third, the concept of societal discrimination was "too amorphous,"
125 Id. at 408-21 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
' 2" 448 U.S. at 463-68, 473-82 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 497-506 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 520-22 (Marshall, J., concurring).
127
 107 S. Ct. at 1058-64.
128
 106 S. Ct. at 1847. Generally speaking, the lower courts had rejected the role model
concept when it was raised to justify assigning black teachers and administrators to black
schools. E.g., United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 046 (1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 963 (1975); Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 518 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Cal.
1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1983), rett'd, 733 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1984); Reed v.
Rhodes, 455 F. Stipp. 546 (N.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd in part and remanded, 607 F.2d 714 (6th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980); Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y.
1976), modified, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). Bet see Kromnick v.
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985);
Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 773 (3c1 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
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and "insufficient" and "over expansive."m Justice O'Connor simi-
larly rejected the concept in her concurring opinion.'"
The views of these four justices in Wygant are counterbalanced
by the view of justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
The first three Justices did not specifically address remediation of
societal discrimination in Wygant, resting their dissent instead on
the important government purpose of "preserving the integrity of
a valid hiring policy."'" There is no reason to suspect, however,
that they have changed their view since Bakke in which they specif-
ically endorsed such a purpose:
[O]ur prior cases unequivocally show that a state govern-
ment may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose
of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact
its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to
believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of
past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at
large.' 32
In contrast to the other dissenting justices, justice Stevens com-
mented upon the remediation of societal discrimination. Not per-
suaded by the fears chronicled in justice Powell's plurality opinion,
justice Stevens found two constitutionally acceptable purposes
served by the layoff provision: the educational soundness of "multi-
ethnic representation on the teaching faculty" and the retention of
recently recruited minority teachers.'" He linked both of these
purposes to remediation of societal discrimination:
129 106 S. Ct. at 1847-48. Wygant struck down a layoff provision in a voluntary affirmative
action program. Arguably, its holding may also call into question orders entered in deseg-
regation cases in which the courts overrode seniority provisions to protect recently hired
minority teachers, most of whom had obtained their jobs as a result of other provisions in
the courts' orders imposing hiring goals. E.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23, 24-28 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1983).
These cases can be distinguished, however. In the school desegregation cases, the inter-
ests at stake are not simply those of the recently hired minority teachers. The Morgan court
observed that "the victims here are the black school children, not the possible hiring discri-
minatees ." 671 F.2d at 27; accord Arthur, 712 F.2d at 822 (teachers' security rights modified
"in order to vindicate the constitutional rights-of the minority children."); Zaslawsky v. Board
of Educ., 610 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The focus of this action of the school board is
to enhance the educational opportunities available to the students," not to eliminate discrim-
ination in employment.).
13" 106 S. Ct. at 1854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
131 Id. at 1863 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In 438 U.S. at 369 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis added).
139 106 S. Ct. at 1868 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
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[T]he fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have
differently colored skin, may give rise to a belief that there
is some significant difference between such persons. The
inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process
inevitably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclu-
sion could only tend to foster it.'" 4
154 Id. at 1869. It is perplexing that Justice Stevens failed to discuss — or even cite —
related Supreme Court precedent and significant social science studies.
On a number of occasions in school desegregation cases, the Court has acknowledged
the importance of a racially integrated faculty in achieving a unitary school system. Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 539-40 & n.11 (1979); Columbus lid. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U,S. 449, 460 (1979); Swami v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 18-20 (1971). It has stressed that an integrated faculty exists for ,the benefit of students,
not minority teachers. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225,
231-32 (1969); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U,S.
103, 104-05 (1965). In turn, several appellate courts have emphasized the importance of the
"role model" concept in approving race-conscious transfers of teachers and modification of
seniority provisions. Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894, 906 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 1982),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1983). But see cases cited supra note 129.
Voluminous social science studies stress the important role minority teachers play in the
intellectual and social development of minority pupils. E.g., M. CHESLER & P. SEGAL, CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF NEGRO STUDENTS ATTENDING PREVIOUSLY ALL-WHITE SCHOOLS IN THE DEEP
SOUTH (1967); R.L. CRAIN & R.E. MAIIARD, THE: INFLUENCE OF HIGH SCHOOL RACIAL COM-
PosiTION ON BLACK COLLEGE ATTENDANCE AND TEST PERFORMANCE (1978); G.A. FOREHAND
& M. RAGOSTA, A HANDBOOK Fort INTEGRATED SCHOOLING 11-12 (1976); G. GAY, DIFFER-
ENTIAL. DYADIC INTERACTION OF BLACK AND WHITE TEACHERS WITH BLACK AND WHITE PUPILS
IN RECENTLY DESEGREGATED SOCIAL STUDIES CLASSROOMS: A FUNCTION OF TEACHER AND
PUPIL ETHNICITY: A FINAL REPORT (1974); R.G. BRIDGE & C. JUDD, rrHE DETERMINANTS OF
EDUCATIONAL. OUTCOMES: THE EFFECTS OF FAMILIES, PEERS, TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS (1979);
R. MAYER El' AL., THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN A SOUTHERN CITY: A CASE
STUDY IN THE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY (1974); M. WEINBERG, MINORITY STUDENTS:
A RESEARCH APPRAISAL 240 (1977); 6 W. HAWLEY, ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
ABouT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION STRATEciEs 86-87 (1981); EFFECTIVE
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: STUDIES IN THE NATIONAL REVIEW PANEL ON SCHOOL DESEGREGA-
TION 30 (W.D,' Hawley, ed. 1981); Bosnia, The Role of Teachers in School Desegregation, 15
INTEGRATED EDUC. 106 (1977); Coates, White Adult Behavior Toward Black and White Children,
43 CHILD DEv. 143 (1972); Henderson & Long, Academic Expectations of Black and White
Teachers for Black and White First Graders, 8 PROC. OF THE 77111 ANNUAL, CONVENTION oe THE
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N 687-88 (1973); Johnson, Gerard & Miller, Teacher Effectiveness in
the Desegregated Classroom, in H.B. GERARD & N. MILLER, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: A LONG-
TERM STUDY (1975); Katz, Some Motivational Determinants of Racial Differences in Intellectual
Achievements, 2 INT'L J. PSY. 1 (1967); Simpson & Erickson, Teacher's Verbal and Nonverbal
Communication Patterns as a Function of 'Teacher Race, Student Gender and Student Race, 20(2),
AM. Enuc. RES. J. 183-98 (1983).
There are some studies that dispute the "role model" thesis. E.g., J.S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, A SUMMARY REPORT 316-19 (1966); E. HANUSHEK, EDUCA-
TION AND RACE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EDUCATIONAL PRODUCTION PROCESS 78-88 (1972);
Clague, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans in Public Education: Matching Faculty Race to Student
Race, 14 J. LAW & EDUc. 309 (1985); Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, J. PoCy ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 19 (1981).
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In sum, the Court as presently composed appears almost evenly
divided over the societal discrimination issue, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia condemning a public
employer's reliance on societal discrimination as a justification for
race/gender-conscious plans and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens approving it. Two final observations are in order.
First, it is unclear how Justice White currently views this issue.
Although he voted with the Brennan group in Bakke, he has dis-
tanced himself from the group on repeated occasions in other con-
texts. His refusal to join Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Wygant,
may, however, indicate that he has not accepted that opinion's
wholesale condemnation of remediation of societal discrimina-
tion) 35
Second, even apart from the remediation of societal discrimi-
nation, the possibility of the Court's accepting predicates other than
the defendant-employer's own discriminatory conduct remains vi-
able, in light of the shifting coalitions of Justices. As evidenced by
their opinion in Bakke, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall
would accept such other predicates as the need for a racially-diverse
faculty.'" Conceivably, they would accept a general claim of a need
for a racially-diverse and gender-balanced work force by most em-
ployers. Certainly, Justice Stevens appears to accept such a claim)"
Likewise, Justice O'Connor has not ruled out the possibility of other
acceptable factual predicates. In Wygant, while condemning reme-
diation of societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate, she
noted that the case did not raise "the very different role of pro-
moting racial diversity among the faculty. ”1311
2: Societal Discrimination and Title VII
The Court almost never raises the subject of societal discrimi-
nation in Title VII cases. In each reverse discrimination case the
1 " See infra notes 180-98 and accompanying text.
156 438 U.S. at 362-73 (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
" 7 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J., concurring); accord Sullivan, The Supreme Court —
Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 96
(1986).
E" 106 S. Ct. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (in an
asterisked footnote).
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Court has considered, the facts were presented in such a fashion as
to explain the absence of minorities, women, or both, as a conse-
quence of the employer's acts. Thus, the Court's attention was con-
sistently directed to the factual predicate offered by the employer
to justify the race/gender-conscious program. The emphasis was
always on what the employer did — not how the infrastructure of
society at large treated minorities and women.
As mentioned earlier, the Court has developed two theories of
liability under Title VII, disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact.'" Disparate treatment looks at the employer's actual motives;
disparate impact looks at the employer's practices. The Court has
never explored in any systematic fashion whether its condemnation
of the remediation of societal discrimination as an acceptable factual
predicate is consistent with its ringing endorsement of the disparate
impact theory. It has avoided this analysis by using the term "societal
discrimination" without defining it. As noted earlier in discussing
Wygani, the Court obviously equates the term with discrimination
caused by an individual or an entity other than the employer. Such
a definition, however, is far too simplistic to be useful. As one
commentator has astutely pointed out,
"societal discrimination" is nothing more than an accu-
mulation of wrongs on the part of governmental and pri-
vate entities that cannot be identified with particularity at
the present time. But their consequences are no less en-
during because they cannot be so identified. The non-
identifiable nature of the discrimination does not obviate
the government's valid and substantial interest in redress-
ing its consequences.k°
In other words, the effects of thousands of acts of discrimination
by both public and private entities have assumed a life of their own,
the effects of which are still being felt by women and minorities
today.
Viewed in this fashion, the relation between societal discrimi-
nation and the disparate impact theory is clear. Such racially neutral
requirements as a high school diploma or a particular passing score
on a pen-and-pencil test frequently impact minority-group mem-
bers in a disparate manner because societal discrimination has ham-
159 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
'" Seller, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14
1-IARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 157 (1979).
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pered their ability to compete. Ironically, Justice Powell, who so
vigorously condemned the remediation of societal discrimination in
Wygant and Bakke acknowledged this fact directly in McDonnell Doug-
las Corporation v. Green."' In referring to the seminal disparate
impact decision he wrote: "Griggs was rightly concerned that child-
hood deficiencies in the education and background of minority
citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed
to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the
remainder of their lives. " 11
Weber and Johnson further illustrate the link between societal
discrimination and the disparate impact theory. Initially, the Kaiser
Company hired only skilled craft workers with five years experience.
Because of the craft unions' overt discrimination, there were almost
no qualified blacks for the Kaiser Company to hire. Although the
'race-conscious training program was jointly agreed to by the craft
unions and the Kaiser Company, the evidence pointed solely to the
unions' discriminatory conduct. Kaiser was remedying the unions'
discrimination and, undoubtedly, the educational deficiencies
caused by the state's segregated school system.
Johnson even more dramatically demonstrates the link between
societal discrimination and disparate impact. Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion approved the plan's implementation based on general
labor pool statistics. Yet it is hard to imagine that many of the
women in the labor pool, which was made up of 36.4% female
workers, were eager or even willing to take jobs involving the kinds
of heavy and dirty manual labor the feeder positions to the road
dispatcher's job required. Societal constructs were more responsible
for the absence of women from .these jobs than any conduct, inten-
tional or unintentional, by the state transportation agency.
These observations concerning the link between societal dis-
crimination and disparate impact, moreover, are indirectly rein-
forced by the previous analysis of the factual predicate issue under
Title VII. As noted, Johnson emphasized the manifest imbalance
prong of the Weber formula to such a degree that the "traditionally
segregated job categories" prong has disappeared. Johnson contains
no requirement that an employer look behind the statistics to de-
termine whether it, the marketplace, the educational system or any
other institution has caused the imbalance.
141 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
142 Id, at 806.
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3. Does the Court's Different Treatment of Societal
Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VII Make Sense?
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, when the Court ap-
proves of a public employer's reliance upon statistics reflecting dis-
parate impact and disapproves of the same employer's desire to
remedy societal discrimination, it is behaving in a schizophrenic
manner. Societal discrimination causes disparate impact and there-
fore, from standpoints of both logic and fairness, should be a per-
missible predicate for remediation as well. justice Powell's concern
that recognition of societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate
would lead to plans that are "over expansive" can be satisfied by
the requirement that the plans have a limited impact on innocent
employees. 143
Furthermore, the Court's condemnation of societal discrimi-
nation in equal protection clause cases makes little sense in light of
the factual ,predicate analysis discussed earlier. As shown, at a min-
imum, there is a five Justice consensus that evidence sufficient to
satisfy Hazelwood's. prima facie case standard will also satisfy Wygant's
demand for "a strong basis in evidence." If impact resembling Ha-
zelwood's establishes a prima facie case, a public sector employer is
free to correct that impact without proof of its own culpability. Once
again, remediation of societal discrimination is the underlying pur-
pose of the plan, not remediation of a discriminatory practice spe-
cifically traceable to the employer.' 44
III. A COURT DIVIDED
Introduction
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion of the issues sur-
rounding the factual predicate needed by a public employer to
" 5 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09. Regardless of (I) whether the case involves court-ordered
race/gender-conscious relief or a voluntary program with these features or (2) whether the
case turns on the equal protection clause or Title VII, the Court always examines the impact
of the challenged plan on "innocent employees," i.e., non-minority employees who are in no
way responsible for the employer's discriminatory conduct. In each case, it examines the
same three questions it first considered in Weber: does the plan require the discharge of non-
minority employees and their replacement by minority employees? Does the plan establish
an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees or applicants? Is the plan designed
to maintain racial balance or simply eliminate racial imbalance? Id. at 208-09. Wygotu is the
only case in which the Court has found an impact sufficiently draconian to void the plan.
106 S. Ct. at 1851-52.
' 41 See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
46	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 30:1
implement a race/gender-conscious plan and the remediation of
societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate, the Court's affir-
mative action opinions betray a general institutional instability. Part
III of this article examines the ideological splintering of the Court
that has led to this problem. Before turning to this analysis, how-
ever, it is necessary to confront a threshold question: What is to be
gained by analyzing the divisions on the Court? Is it not enough to
simply examine the past and look to the future? Three considera-
tions prompt a negative response. First, the analysis in Part II
describes the impact of the Court's fractured jurisprudence on two
critical issues: the employer-specific, factual predicate for race/gen-
der-conscious plans and the remediation of societal discrimination
as an acceptable factual predicate. It does not explain why the Court
has failed to reach a consensus. Second, to say simply that the
absence of a consensus is attributable to different and shifting ju-
dicial philosophies does a disservice to the Justices by merely label-
ing their jurisprudence, not exploring it. Third, this discussion will
contribute to examinations of the jurisprudence of the Justices in
the context of other issues, leading ultimately to a better under-
standing of each Justice's overall constitutional ethos. 145
Essentially, there are two core groups of Justices, one "liberal"
and one "conservative." 196
 The liberal group has a slight numerical
'" Hopefully, this analysis will also assist practicing attorneys who litigate reverse dis-
crimination cases. Because of the divisions on the Court, the lower courts will be particularly
interested in learning how a challenged race/gender-conscious program corresponds to the
views of the particular Justices.
"" It is interesting to speculate how far and how deep this liberal/conservative division
runs. In the 1986 Term, the Term the Court decided Paradise and Johnson, Justice Brennan
and Chief Justice Rehnquist took opposite positions in 86 cases. The lineup of the other
Justices is also illuminating. Justice Scalia voted with the Chief Justice in 84% of the cases;
Justice White, 80%; and Justice O'Connor, 72%. Justice Marshall voted with Justice Brennan
in 97% of the cases; Justice Blackmun, 70%; and Justice Stevens, 62%. Nat'l L.J., Aug. 17,
1987, at 5-3, col. 1. See also infra note 159.
The considerable unanimity of the Court in other civil rights cases graphically illustrates
the divisiveness or reverse discrimination cases handed clown in the 1986 Term. In St. Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987) and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107
S. Ct. 2019 (1987), the Court unanimously expanded the scope of section 1981 or 1982
coverage, holding that the statute protected "identifiable classes of persons who are subjected
to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." St.
Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028. In City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 794
(1987), the Court by a 6-3 vote held that a city's refusal to annex a black neighborhood
violated section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Justice White is the author of all three
opinions. Finally, in Board of Directors of Rotary Intl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct.
1940 (1987), seven Justices, two Justices having recused themselves, rejected a first amend-
ment challenge to a California public accommodations statute prohibiting gender discrimi-
nation.
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edge over the conservative group, but neither can consistently com-
mand a majority of votes. Thus, both groups must carefully craft
their opinions to win the support of the nonaligned Justices. The
practical necessity of compromise leads to opinions whose control-
ling principles are expressed in the most general of terms. Fur-
thermore, the hesitancy of the nonaligned Justices concerning even
these general principles often leads them (1) to refuse to join the
majority or plurality opinion altogether, simply joining in the judg-
ment; (2) to join only parts of the majority or plurality opinion;
and/or (3) to file separate concurring opinions expressing their
disagreement with the majority or plurality opinion. Consequently,
the principles expressed in these cases are often too vague to be
useful and too qualified to be of weighty precedential value.
Although the terms "liberal" and "conservative" are often noth-
ing more than labels substituting for analysis, their designation here
has a precise meaning. Their content is determined by reference to
the earliest race-conscious cases to reach the Court, Bakke and Ful-
lilove under the equal protection clause and Weber under Title VII,
"Liberal" describes the jurisprudence of those Justices who look to
the "spirit" of Title VII which the Weber Court found so persuasive.
When a state uses-
 race to benefit minorities rather than to stigmatize
them, "liberal" camp Justices strenuously argue in favor of applying
the intermediate test rather than the strict scrutiny test under the
equal protection clause. The core principles of their statutory and
constitutional jurisprudence are animated by two overriding con-
cerns: a firm desire to encourage employers to implement race/
gender-conscious programs voluntarily, and a general solicitude for
such programs because they bring long excluded groups into the
economic mainstream.
"Conservative" describes the jurisprudence of those Justices
who reject Weber's reliance on the "spirit" of Title VII and who
argue that both the plain language of the statute and its legislative
history flatly contradict the majority opinion. Despite stare decisis,
the conservative Justices remain ready to overrule Weber. "Conser-
vative" camp Justices insist that racial classifications, whether used
to benefit or to stigmatize minority group members, are subject to
the strict scrutiny test under the equal protection clause because of
their inherently pernicious character. These core principles reflect
an odd mixture of restraint and activism: restraint because these
Justices insist upon a strict adherence to the literal language of Title
VII's legislative history; activism because they reject stare decisis and
so aggressively review the state's factual predicate and the structure
48	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1
of the race/gender-conscious plan to determine its impact on non-
minority employees and applicants.
Even in the context of these definitions, however, the terms
"liberal" and "conservative" are nuanced. They are used here to
provide an analytical framework — not to straightjacket the Justices
and their decisions in this complex area.
The liberal camp is led by Justice Brennan with Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens being key players. Because the first
three Justices generally vote as a bloc, they are considered together.
The conservative camp is essentially a three-Justice bloc consisting
of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and White. Because
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia share a common analytical
approach, they are discussed as a unit. Justice White is analyzed
separately along with Justice Stevens to illustrate how their evolving
jurisprudence has contributed to the Court's doctrinal instability.
With the Court roughly divided concerning the core principles
governing the statutory and constitutional antidiscrimination
norms, the views of Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor became
critical. They have been the Court's "free agents," voting with the
liberal camp on some occasions and with the conservative camp on
others. It remains to be seen whether Justice Kennedy will follow
Justice Powell's lead in this respect or more closely align himself
with the views of either camp.
A. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun: The Liberal Camp
Baseball buffs remember with fondness "Tinker to Evers to
Chance," 147 a fabled combination of three players who never missed
a double play. "Brennan to Marshall to Blackmun" is the fabled
combination of the Court's liberal camp. In not one of the nine
affirmative action cases have they voted to strike down the race or
gender-conscious program under review.
I. Title VII Cases
The first famous "throw" of the threesome is, of course, Weber.
Faced with a statute that on its faCe invalidated the Kaiser program
1 " "These . are the saddest of possible words,/ Tinker to Evers to Chance.? Trio of bear
cubs, and fleeter than birds,/ Tinker to Evers to Chance.? Ruthlessly pricking our gonfalon
bubble,/ Making a Giant hit into a double — Words that are weighty with nothing but
trouble:! Tinker to Evers to Chance.'" F.P. ADAMS, BASEBALL'S SAD LEXICON, quoted in Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S 258, 264 n.5 (1972).
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and thousands of others just like it in both the public and private
sector,'" Justice Brennan in Weber rejected the statute's plain mean-
ing in favor of its "spirit."' 49 Weber is the catalyst for the two concerns
just described as underlying the liberal camp's core principles. First,
in enacting Title VII Congress's overriding goal was to integrate
blacks into the mainstream of the American economy. Second, vol-
untary action by employers was central to achieving Congress's
goal.'"
There was some early disagreement among members of the
liberal camp, however. Justice Blackmun favored a more rigorous
"arguable violation" approach to the factual predicate issue instead
of the majority opinion's "racial imbalance" approach. By joining
Justice Brennan's opinion in Johnson without any reservation, Justice
Blackmun appears to have abandoned the "arguable violation" part
of his concurring opinion in Weber. His shift reinforces the liberal
camp's support of principles encouraging voluntary compliance
with Title 1/11's mandates. .
How consistently the two concerns of economic integration and
the promotion of voluntary plans appear in later cases is easily
demonstrated.' 5 ' For example, when confronted with language
whose surface meaning appeared to limit race/gender-conscious
relief to the actual victims of discrimination, the liberal camp in City
of Cleveland, discussed earlier, 152 circumvented the language's nar-
rowness by holding that section 706(g) was inapplicable to consent
judgments. To reach this holding the City of Cleveland Court turned
to the statute's legislative history, emphasizing Congress's decision
to maximize voluntary efforts and to protect managerial preroga-
tives of employers and unions.'" These same concerns also played
a prominent part in Justice Brerman's majority opinion in Johnson.
By deliberately leaving the "manifest imbalance" definition of Weber
open-ended in Johnson, the liberal camp gave a great boost to affir-
mative action proponents who correctly read the opinion encour-
aging the adoption of voluntary plans by easing the employer's
burden in compiling statistical data to support race/gender-con-
scious decisions. Furthermore, by relying upon general labor pool
1 " See Supra note 82.
149 Weber, 443 U.S. 193,201 (1979).
15° Id. at 206-07.
151 Id. at 202-08 (passim); accord Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452-53, 1456-57; Local 28, 106
S. Ct. at 3035-36.
I" See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
154 106 S. Ct. at 8072-75.
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statistics without asking the key question whether women had ever
sought heavy, manual labor jobs in the first place, Johnson also
opened the way for the fuller integration of women into the main-
stream of the American economy.
2. Equal Protection Clause Cases
Both Wygant and Paradise illustrate that the core principles of
the liberal camp have carried the day in equal protection clause
cases as well as in Title VII cases. Even before Wygant, in Bakke and
Fullilove, cases that did not involve employment-related decisions, a
majority of the Justices supported the proposition that race-con-
scious decisions by the state or federal government did not violate
the equal protection clause despite the absence of a specific judicial,
legislative, or administrative finding of discrimination.'" Wygant
confirmed explicitly what Bakke and Fullilove had suggested implic-
itly. Eight Justices agreed that race-conscious relief could be appro-
priate to remedy prior discrimination even in the absence of a
formal finding of discrimination. They also agreed that hiring goals
were likely to withstand an equal protection challenge because the
burden on non-minorities was diffuse. Finally, at a minimum, they
agreed that under the equal protection clause, an employer could
legitimately adopt a race/gender-conscious affirmative action pro-
gram based on statistical disparities.'"
Accordingly, the majority vote in Wygant can be viewed as fully
consistent with the liberal camp's core principles. The opinion re-
jected only the plan's race-conscious layoff provision. Furthermore,
a majority of the Court did not hold such relief always unconstitu-
tional.
The Paradise decision also rested on core liberal camp princi-
ples. It extended to the fourteenth amendment the principle al-
ready established under Title VII in Local 28 that a district court's
remedial powers sweep extra broadly where the defendant's dis-
criminatory conduct had been egregious and its attitude toward the
court's enforcement powers overtly hostile. In allowing a one-for-
' 5 ' Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473-76; id. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 517-20
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363-69 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
'SS Compare Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847-49 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Rehnquist, J.) and id. at 1853-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) with it at 1858-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and id. at 1867-71 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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one promotion quota that significantly exceeded the percentage of
qualified minorities in the labor pool, Paradise actually went several
steps beyond Local 28. Finally, it insisted upon a narrow reading of
Weber's "impact" requirement in light of the fact that (1) no non-
minority lost a job, in contrast to Wygant; (2) the minority benefi-
ciaries of the quota were qualified; and (3) the promotion expec-
tancies of non-minorities were only postponed, not extinguished.' 56
In sum, the liberal camp, led by Justice Brennan, has been instru-
mental in shaping the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence.
Outstanding baseball players whose talents have dazzled fans,
critics, and colleagues are usually rewarded by being elected into
the Hall of Fasme. If there were a Supreme Court Hall of Fame,
Justice Brennan's election would be a foregone conclusion. An in-
defatigable leader of the liberal camp, he has repeatedly led a
coalition of Justices in a string of victories, upholding the statutory
and constitutional right of employers, unions, and courts to imple-
ment race/gender-conscious hiring and promotion plans. The lib-
eral camp has not walked off with the game, however. Its victories
have been hard fought. Although Justice Brennan could count on
the votes of Justices Marshall and Blackmun, from the beginning,
and the vote of Justice Stevens in the most recent cases, Justice
Brennan always had to undertake the arduous task of persuading
one or two of his more reluctant peers to join the liberal camp. His
success rate has earned him the reputation of "the 'play-maker' of
the Court, the consensus builder who somehow manages, in case
after case, to get votes for very liberal opinions,"' 57
Justice Brennan's own description of his consensus building
techniques is revealing:
It really isn't very mysterious or complex, what we do.
Just look at how we work in these chambers. We debate
the issues, the merits, and when it comes time to write, we
discuss the various possible approaches. We ask about
some of the approaches. Will this be rejected by Lewis
Powell or Harry Blackmun? Will Thurgood agree with
this? Has John Stevens written any cases which may sug-
gest how he is thinking and about which we should be
aware? What does Sandra think? You try to get, in advance
of circulation, a sense of what will sell, what the others
156 107 S. Ct. at 1073.
157 Leeds, A Life on the Court: A Conversation with Justice Brennan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 73, col. 2.
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can accept. And you write it that way, and when it works
out — and maybe you have suggestions that come in and
perhaps you make substantial revisions — but when it
works out and you have a Court, you are delighted.'"
Justice Brennan's successful consensus building has a dark side,
however. To keep the nonaligned Justices' votes he must often soft-
peddle issues, speaking in the most general of terms. Such difficult,
pressing questions as the difference between a "prima facie" standard
and a "manifest imbalance" standard or when to apply the inter-
mediate standard as opposed to the strict-scrutiny test, can be
treated only in the subtlest of terms — terms so subtle that they
offer little or no useful guidance to the lower courts, unions, em-
ployers, and employees. Although Justice Brennan cannot be per-
sonally faulted for these failures — after all, a consensus builder
cannot exceed the limits of the consensus — the divisions among
the majority/plurality Justices and the opinions' resulting ambigui-
ties temper the liberal camp's victories, leaving them vulnerable to
narrow interpretations in future cases.
Despite these serious shortcomings the high quality of Justice
Brennan's leadership must be acknowledged. To join the Hall of
Fame you do not have to strike out every hitter or bat 1000 percent.
Justice Brennan's winning streak, though not perfect in every re-
spect, is nevertheless a feat of no mean accomplishment.
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia: Securing the Conservative
Camp's Core Principles.
Nicknamed the "Lone Dissenter" by Court observers and his
clerks, who once presented him with a Lone Ranger doll, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has doggedly led the conservative camp in each
of the nine cases.'" Unlike Justice Brennan, he does not have the
i" Id. at 73-75.
15" Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk With Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1985, 6
(Magazine), at 33-34. It is interesting to speculate whether the frequency of his lone dissents
and concurring opinions will decrease over the years following his appointment as Chief
justice. During the confirmation hearings, then Justice Rehnquist testified that even when
he only differed slightly with the other Justices he would issue a separate opinion, feeling
"it won't harm anyone." Acknowledging "it does muddy the message," he promised that as
Chief justice he would seek to curb the proliferation of opinions. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1986,
at A 14, col. 3-4. It is difficult to measure his success by Paradise and Johnson. Although they
contain fewer separate opinions than the earlier cases, their jurisprudence remains mired.
He was unable to mend the Court's divisions in his first year as Chief justice. In the 1986
Term, the Court split 5 to 4 in 43 cases; in the 1985 Term the Court split 5 to 4 in 35 cases.
Nat'l L.j., Aug. 17, 1987, at 5-3, col. 1.
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advantage of a few loyal players who will vote with him as consis-
tently as Justices Marshall and Blackmun have voted with Justice
Brennan. For example, in Fullilove, Chief justice Burger, his ally in
Weber, abandoned the conservative camp, writing an opinion up-
holding the constitutionality of the ten percent set-aside. Justice
Powell, whose opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist joined striking down
the layoff provision in Wygant, voted to uphold the gender-con-
scious promotion plan in Johnson. Given the shifting and uncertain
composition of the conservative camp, it is remarkable that Chief
Justice Rehnquist has managed to contain liberal camp victories.
The closeness of the voting in each case reflects the intellectual
vigor, keen logic, and persuasive rhetoric that he brings to this
highly complex area of the law.
1. Title VII Cases
Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on affirmative action set the
tone for the conservative camp's Title VII jurisprudence:
There is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion
of equality than the numerus clauses — the quota. Whether
described as "benign discrimination" or "affirmative ac-
tion," the racial quota is nonetheless a creator of castes, a
two-edged sword that must demean one in order to prefer
another.'"
Despite the directness and vigor of this view, the opinions Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote and those he joined are considerably more
nuanced. In Title VII cases, for example, his opinions predomi-
nantly focus on the language of the particular provision under
review and the intent of Congress as manifested in its legislative
history. Even the most ardent supporters of affirmative action would
acknowledge that his views have a strong legal basis, especially in
the statute's 1964 legislative history.
According to the Chief Justice, the question posed in Weber was
straightforward: what did Congress intend when it enacted the
antidiscrimination language in sections 703(a) and (d) and 706(g)?
His response rested on the plain, surface meaning of the provisions'
language. Accordingly, he eschewed any recourse to the "spirit" of
Title VII invoked by Justice Brennan's majority opinion to go be-
yond the statutes' language. In an exhaustive and excruciatingly
180 Weber, 443 U.S. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
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detailed examination of the congressional debate surrounding the
passage of Title VII, he pointed out the repeated occasions when
supporters of Title VII assured opponents and skeptics that it would
not tolerate any form of racial quota."H
Chief Justice Rehnquist's clash with the liberal camp over Con-
gress's intent has never subsided. In Local 28 and in City of Cleveland,
he again insisted that the language Congress selected in drafting
section 706(g) should dictate the outcome of the cases.' 62 There is,
however, one notable difference between his dissent in those cases
and in Weber, a difference that reflects his power of intellectual
discernment and candor. In Weber, he adamantly maintained that
both the language of the statutory provisions and their legislative
history reflected Congress's clear intent to prohibit race-conscious
remedies. In City of Cleveland, he conceded that "the legislative
history [of section 706(g)] may be fairly apportioned among both
sides." 163 His willingness to make this concession reflects a mature
judgment, one from which a pure ideologue might easily have been
dissuaded.
Title VII quota cases in particular seem to stimulate Chief
Justice Rehnquist's interest. In only one such case has he ever
refrained from filing a separate opinion and joined in another
Justice's opinion. The case in question is Johnson; the dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Scalia. His deference to Justice Scalia
is not surprising. Both the opinion's tone and its analysis of the
merits of the promotion scheme are starkly reminiscent of Justice
Rehnquist's Weber dissent.'" Part II of the Weber dissent begins:
"Were Congress to act today specifically to prohibit the type of racial
discrimination suffered by Weber, it would be hard pressed to draft
language better tailored to the task than that found in § 703(d) of
Title VII . . . 1965 The opening sentence of Justice Scalia's dissent
reads: "With a clarity which, had it not proven so unavailing, one
might well recommend as a model of statutory draftsmanship, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares . .." 66 Immediately
01 Id. at 226-55.
' 62 City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. at 3085-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Local 28, 106 S. Ct.
at 3082 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165 106 S. Ct. at 3087 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16-1 In addition to sharing a common conservative philosophy, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia have similar writing styles. Both delight in aphorisms and metaphor; their
opinions radiate intellectual vigor and intensity and arc aggressive and witty in tone; their
dissents are sharp and biting.
' 65 443 U.S. at 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'"" 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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following these excerpts, both opinions quote section 703 of Title
VII. The rhetoric of Justice Scalia's dissent is acerbic, matching
Weber's. Its logic rests on the Court's antecedent decisions in Local
28 and City of Cleveland, claiming in effect that Johnson shunted
them aside, just as Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed Weber shunted
aside Congress's intent.
Justice Scalia's dissent, however, reaches beyond the question
of statutory interpretation to a larger issue: if Weber was incorrectly
decided, should the Court nonetheless respect the principle of stare
decisis? Because he joined Justice Scalia's dissent, without reserva-
tion, presumably Chief Justice Rehnquist also answers that question
in the negative.' 67 It .is noteworthy that in urging the abandonment
of Weber, Justice Scalia turned to two arguments, the first of which
held the Chief Justice's interest in Weber: the fiction that employers
adopt affirmative action plans "voluntarily," rather than under the
threat of adverse government action or in response to the demands
of organized groups for economic benefit for their constituencies.' 68
The second argument is one that Justice Scalia has advanced for
some time, namely, that race/gender-conscious plans cause an em-
ployer to dilute the quality of its work force because it will select a
minimally qualified member of the underrepresented race or gen-
der over a better qualified applicant who does not share the desired
characteristics. 't'`•'
167 Id. at 1473-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
1"8 Compare id. at 1474 (Scalia, J., dissenting) with Weber, 443 U.S. at 246 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
169 107 S. Ct. at 1474-75 (Scalia, J. dissenting); Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race.", 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147. In that law review
article, which received much prominence during his confirmation hearings, Justice Scalia
wrote:
Unfortunately, the world of employment applicants does not divide itself merely
into "qualified" and "unqualified" individuals. There is a whole range of ability
— from unqualified, through minimally qualified, qualified, well-qualified, to
outstanding. If I can't get Leontyne Price to sing a concert I have scheduled,
may have to settle for Erma Glatt. La Glatt has a pretty good voice, but not as
good as Price. Is she unqualified? Not really — she has sung other concerts
with modest success. But she is just not as good as Price. Any system that coerces
me to hire her in preference to Price, because of her race, degrades the quality
of my product and discriminates on racial grounds against Price. And it is no
answer to either of these charges that Glatt is "qualified." To seek to assuage
either the employer's demand for quality or the disfavored applicant's demand
limr equal treatment by saying there is no need to hire any unqualified individuals
is a sort of intellectual shell game, which diverts attention from the major issue
by firmly responding to a minor one.
Id.
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It is difficult and often foolhardy to make predictions about
the career of a player after he has been in the major leagues for
only a year. The same is true of a Supreme Court Justice, especially
if he has written only one opinion in the area. Yet Justice Scalia's
opinion in Johnson, supported by his earlier writings,'" leads to the
inescapable conclusion that he accepts without hesitation the core
principles of the conservative camp. Under these circumstances, it
is readily apparent why Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned him the
task of writing the dissent in Johnson.
2. Equal Protection Clause Cases
In equal protection clause cases, unlike Title VII cases, Chief
Justice Rehnquist generally does not write a separate opinion. In
Fullilove, he joined Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, and in Wy-
gant, he joined Justice Powell's plurality opinion. Dominating those
opinions are two inquiries: for what purpose was the race-conscious
relief designed, and how narrowly was the relief crafted?
Justice Stewart's strident dissent in Fullilove literally interpreted
the first Justice Harlan's call in Plessy'7 ' for a color-blind Constitu-
tion. 172
 Justice Stewart's dissent insisted upon the application of the
strict scrutiny test and would have invalidated the ten percent set-
aside program. Central to the dissenters' position was the absence
of any congressional finding of discrimination in the awarding of
contracts. Significantly, the dissent did not say that Congress or the
courts could never consider race in fashioning an equitable remedy.
Indeed, it said just the opposite, citing both prior decisions in em-
ployment discrimination cases under Title VII and school deseg-
regation cases under the equal protection clause.'" The dissent did
caution, however, that even if Congress had designed the set-aside
provision to remedy past discrimination, a strict scrutiny analysis
would still result in the statute's invalidation: although satisfying
' 7 " 107 S. Ct. at 1465-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Scalia, supra note 169.
' 71 Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
112 Fulldove, 448 U.S. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' 73 448 U.S. at 525 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart observed:
A court of equity may, of course, take race into account in devising a remedial
decree to undo a violation of a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race. But such a judicial decree, following litigation in which a violation of law
has been determined, is wholly different from generalized legislation that
awards benefits and imposes detriments dependent upon the race of the recip-
ients.
Id. at 525 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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the test's first prong, a compelling governmental interest, it would
fail the second prong because the means selected, the across-the-
board ten percent set-aside for six racial groups, was "not carefully
tailored to fit the nature and extent of the violation."' 74
Because Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Wygant borrowed
heavily from Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove, it is not surprising
that Chief Justice Rehnquist joined it as well. Opting for a strict
scrutiny standard, Justice Powell's opinion too examined, first, the
governmental goal and, second, the means. The layoff provision
failed both prongs. Because a majority of the Justices declined to
remand the case to permit the school district to show that it adopted
the lay off provision to remedy past discriminatory conduct, the
plurality opinion had to address the issue of whether remedying
Societal discrimination was a compelling purpose. As noted earlier,
Justice Powell's answer, and presumably Justice Rehnquist's too, was
a resounding "No."L 75 Before such a race-conscious remedy could
be implemented, an employer had to possess "a strong basis in
evidence" to justify the conclusion that there had been prior dis-
crimination.' 7" Other than to endorse Hazelwood, the plurality opin-
ion, however, shed no light on what constituted "a strong basis."
Justice Powell's plurality opinion also applied the "means"
prong of the strict scrutiny test to the lay-off mechanism itself. As
discussed earlier, according to Justice Powell, the plan's impact on
innocent third parties, the white teachers with greater seniority, was
too great to satisfy the equal protection clause's demand for nar-
rowly-tailored, race-conscious relief.'"
In the end, what is most remarkable about the conservative
camp's performance is that, without constant support from the same
set of colleagues, Chief Justice Rehnquist has managed to keep the
games' scores so close. Although the liberal camp has outplayed the
conservative camp, it has had to fight vigorously every step of the
way. Justice Scalia's appointment to the Supreme Court adds a
strong, steady hitter to the Chief Justice's line up.' 78 On occasion,
' 74 Id. at 530 n.12.
'" 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
L76 Id.
1" See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
178 It is unrealistic to expect that Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist will always
agree in employment discrimination cases. For example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Title V1I's prohibition
against sex discrimination encompassed sexual harassment. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). Justice
Scalia, then a member of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, had espoused precisely
the opposite conclusion in the very same case, joining an opinion by Judge Bork. Vinson v.
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Justice Kennedy may join these two players in the conservative camp
dugout.'" No longer the Lone Dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist
may very well lead the conservative camp on to an impressive win-
ning streak — maybe in the end even closing down the affirmative
action ballpark.
C. Justice White and Justice Stevens
The voting strength of the two core groups of Justices has
remained fairly constant due to an almost equal number of players
— three certain votes being cast by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun in favor of race/gender-conscious plans and two certain
votes against such plans being cast by either Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart or Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Essentially,
the jurisprudence of the two groups has been static, with each
Justice voting in accordance with the core principles reflecting his
or her views. In contrast, the jurisprudence of Justices White and
Stevens has been dynamic, evolving with each case. The evolution
of their views has contributed to the Court's overall jurisprudential
instability, a problem well illustrated by the number of separate
opinions they have each filed, especially in the more recent cases.
I. Justice White: An Unexplained Journey from the Liberal
Camp to the Conservative Camp and the Possibility of Return
Initially, Justice White was a silent member of the liberal camp.
In Weber, he joined Justice Brennan's majority opinion.'" In Bakke,
again following Justice Brennan's lead, he voted to adopt the inter-
mediate standard of review and rejected the equal protection chal-
lenge to the medical school's special admissions program.' 81 The
first suggestion of any misgivings appeared in Fullilove. Without
explanation, he joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which spe-
cifically declined to adopt the strict scrutiny or intermediate stan-
dard, expressing the belief that the "MBE provision would survive
judicial review under either 'test' . ." 182 Of course, this left only
Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting from the denial of a
reh'g en banc).
19 See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
th° 443 U.S. at 195.
131 438 U.S. at 355-62.
En 448 U.S. at 492. Professor Choper has speculated that Justice White joined Chief
Justice Burger's opinion as a matter of politics "to lend sufficient numerical strength to the
Burger opinion so as to allow the Chief Justice to announce the judgment of the Court."
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Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall expressly supporting
application of the intermediate standard to programs benefitting
underrepresented groups.
The evolution of Justice White's jurisprudence became more
pronounced in Firefighters Local Union Number 1784 a Stotts.' 83 In
that case, the district court, over the objection of the defendant city,
modified the city's layoff procedures in order to preserve gains in
minority employment. The gains resulted from an affirmative ac-
tion plan adopted by the city as part of a consent judgment settling
a Title VII action filed by minority firefighters. 184 The opinion,
however, included very pointed dicta limiting Title VII relief to
actual, identified victims of discrimination. Undoubtedly, the dicta
did not slip by unnoticed; nor was this language's inclusion inad-
vertent. To begin with, the dicta stretched over five pages.'" Fur-
thermore, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed its correctness in her con-
curring opinion.' 86 Finally, Justices Stevens and Blackmun attacked
the dicta vigorously in their respective concurring and dissenting
opinions.'" That dicta triggered a wave of intense apprehension
among affirmative action proponents because it undercut the legit-
imacy of tens of thousands of race/gender-conscious plans in the
public and private sector. It also spurred the Reagan Administration
to a controversial attempt to reopen fifty settlements to which the
United States had been a party for the purpose of exorcising such
relief.'"
Since Stotts, Justice White has consistently voted against race/
gender-conscious plans in each of the five cases to come before the
Court.' 8" Regrettably, his subsequent opinions shed little light on
Choper, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 KY. L.J. I,
5-6 q .30 (1981).
1 " 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
1" Id, at 565-68.
I " 467 U.S. at 578-83.
'a" Id. at 587-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
i" Id. at 590-92 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 611-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
l" N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,1986, at 88, col. 1.
189 Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1465 (White, J„ dissenting); Paradise 107 S. Ct. at 1080 (White, J.,
dissenting); City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. at 3081-82 (White, J., dissenting); Local 28, 106 S.
Ct. at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment). Justice White's jurisprudence has always displayed a conservative bent. For
example, he dissented along with Justice Rehnquist in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,221-23
(1973) (White, J., dissenting). In the Roe dissent, Justice White wrote:
[als an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do
what it does today; but in my view its judgment is an improvident and extrav-
agant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to
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the reasons prompting his new allegiance. His refusal to adopt
either camp's core principals significantly contributes to the Court's
institutional instability.
Two cases in particular demonstrate the absence of elaboration
that characterizes Justice White's opinions. In Wygant, he filed a
one-paragraph opinion concurring in the judgment. It stated only
that laying off white teachers to retain black teachers violated the
equal protection clause.' 90 No cases were cited; nor was any expla-
nation given why the dissent was incorrect or why he declined to
join the plurality opinion. Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in
Paradise, he was content to state: "Agreeing with much of what
Justice O'CONNOR has written in this case, I find it evident that
the District Court exceeded its equitable powers in devising a rem-
edy in this case. I therefore dissent from the judgment of affirm-
atice."' 9 ' Again, he failed to identify with any degree of particularity
with which parts of the dissent he agreed and disagreed. Justice
White left unanswered several questions. What made the remedy
"excessive?" Was it because the one-for-one ratio exceeded the per-
centage of minority troopers in the entry level positions as Justice
O'Connor suggested? What percentage would have been appropri-
ate?
The closest Justice -White came to an articulation of principle
was in City of Cleveland.' 92 That he chose to write in this case is not
surprising because the majority used City of Cleveland and its com-
panion case, Local 28, to cut back on the dicta in his Stotts opinion,
limiting Title VII relief to actual victims. Although he retreated
from his blanket disavowal of non-victim relief in Stotts without
elaboration, Justice White did explain why he believed the consent
judgment was invalid. He characterized the promotion plan as a
this Court .... In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over
which reasonable men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's
exercise of its clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to
state efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers arid doctors with
the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for the most
part, should be left with the people and to the political processes the people
have devised to govern their affairs.
Id. at 222. Justices Rehnquist and White have not abandoned their position on the abortion
issue. 'Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169,
2192 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice White authored the majority opinion
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 284 l (1986), refusing to extend the constitutional right of
privacy to homosexual conduct between consenting adults,
00 106 S. Ct. at 1857-58 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
107 S. Ct. at 1080 (White, J., dissenting).
m2 106 S. Ct. at 3082 (White, J., dissenting).
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"kind of [racial] leapfrogging," denying senior white firefighters
promotions in favor of minorities.'" Three facts seemed to rankle
his sensibilities: the promoted black employees were not victims of
discrimination; the white employees were not responsible for any
discriminatory practices; and the white employees were better qual-
ified.' 91 •
In the end, his focus on these three facts, along with his opin-
ions in Stotts and Johnson, I 95 may provide the most insight into justice
White's jurisprudence. As more cases have come before the Court,
his attention has turned from class relief, which was at the core of
Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove, to the impact of that relief on the non-
minority employees and applicants. Underlying his opinions and
votes is an intensification of concern for those individuals whose
promotion expectations have been diminished because of their race.
Despite Justice White's concern for non-minority employees
and applicants, he does not necessarily condemn all race/gender-
conscious programs. For example, he disagreed with Johnson's gloss
on Weber's "manifest imbalance" test not necessarily the original
formulation of the "manifest imbalance" test.t's He admitted that
non-victim relief may be permitted under limited circumstances and
has never formally endorsed the strict scrutiny test. 197 In sum, Jus-
tice White remains less ideologically opposed to race/gender-con-
scious criteria than his recent voting pattern implies and may yet
join future liberal camp opinions, particularly if the race/gender
plan has minimal impact on current employees.
2. Justice Stevens's Evolving Jurisprudence
Unlike Justice White, justice Stevens, especially in the most
recent cases, is quick to justify his vote directly and willing to explain
at length why, how, and to what degree his thoughts have changed.
Justice Stevens's candor is particularly welcome because of the na-
ture of the criticism he directed to Congress in Fullilove and because
of his continuing belief that Weber was wrongly decided.'"
193 Id.
194 Id. This last assertion is highly dubious.
1 " 107 S. Ct. at 1465 (White, J., dissenting).
line Id .
197 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
1115 Justice Stevens's views on the statutory and constitutional issues raised in the earliest
cases involving race-conscious plans are shrouded. In Bakke, he avoided the constitutional
issue by fielding a dispository statutory issue. 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). He did not take part in Weber.
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a. Justice Stevens and the Equal Protection Clause
Justice Stevens's constitutional jurisprudence concerning race/
gender-conscious programs contains a strong strain of the maverick.
His independent thinking first manifested itself in Fullilove. His
dissent in that case was idiosyncratic, both in tone and on the merits.
The tone was one of controlled anger. He labeled the set-aside
program "a somewhat perverse form of reparation," "a slapdash
statute,"°° and suggested that Congress look to the laws of Nazi
Germany as "precedents" for defining racial characteristics. 200
 On
the merits, his quarrel with Congress was four-fold: Congress failed
to explain why each of the six racial groups was entitled to share
equally in the set-aside; the set-aside would inevitably lead to a
permanent distribution of benefits along racial lines; it was over-
inclusive because it benefitted firms not suffering from the present
effects of discrimination; and it was the product of an inattentive
Congress. 20 ' Despite his stridencey, Justice Stevens did not take as
firm an anti-affirmative action stand as the other dissenters in Ful-
lilove. On at least three occasions, he stated that he was not closing
the door on race-conscious relief permanently, but rather merely
rejecting it in this case. 202
 His later opinions, of course, endorsed
such relief.
Wygant also reflects the maverick in Justice Stevens's jurispru-
dence. Two features of his dissenting opinion particularly stand
out. The first is his formulation of the appropriate standard of
review. The second is his apparent acceptance of remediation of
societal discrimination and the provision of role-models for minority
school children as acceptable predicates for race/gender-conscious
plans.
For a number of years, Justice Stevens has criticized the Court's
formulation of the traditional standards of review, maintaining
"what has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protec-
tion claims does not describe a completely logical method of decid-
ing cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably con-'
sistent fashion."'" He would replace the traditional standards of
'" 448 U.S. at 538-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" I Id. at 537-39, 549-50, 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2n 1d. at 537-45 (passim), 548, 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); accord City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring);
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review with a rational basis test consisting of four questions: "What
class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a
'tradition of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that
is being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disad-
vantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment? "204
 He applied
this personal test in Wygant. Thus, his dissenting opinion addressed
the question whether the public interest "in educating children for
the future ... and the manner in which it is pursued, justify] any
adverse effects on the disadvantaged group." 205 He concluded that
the Board's pedagogical drive for "multi-ethnic representation on
the teaching faculty" had constituted "a rational and unquestionably
legitimate basis"206 for the layoff provision. Not even Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, or Blackmun have ever argued in favor of a rational
basis test for race/gender-conscious decisions.
in analyzing the second prong of his test, the effects of an
affirmative action plan on the disadvantaged group, Justice Stevens
looked first to the procedures used to adopt the program, and
second, to the harm inflicted. His concern with process here echoes
his dissenting opinion in Fullilove, but the result is very different.
The participation of the disadvantaged group members in the de-
cision to implement the race-conscious layoff provision greatly in-
fluenced him in Wygant. 2"7 Since Justice Stevens regarded the col-
lective-bargaining process as scrupulously fair, he concluded that
the layoff provision was "narrowly circumscribed." 208 With respect
to the harm inflicted, he could find no stigma, no lack of respect
for the white race, and no blind habit and stereotype, because the
lay-offs resulted from unfortunate economic conditions and the
need to preserve an integrated faculty. 209
Justice Stevens also approached Paradise from a unique per-
spective. Emphasizing that the Court was reviewing a district court
order based on a finding of discrimination, he took a sweeping view
of the district court's remedial powers, relying on the Court's school
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in judgment). See generally Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1146 (1987). Justice Marshall is similarly troubled by the Court's tiered
Formula, Note, Justice Marshall and Equal Protection Review: A Spectrum of Standards!, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1251 (1986).
204 Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
203 106 S. Ct. at 1867 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
21).5 Id. al 1868.
207 1d. at 1870.
208 1d.
2091d.
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desegregation cases. He rejected "calculations of hardship" suffered
by white employees, focusing entirely on the defendant's egregious
violations of the equal protection clause."' Because cases involving
deliberate flouting of the law argue for broad and flexible powers,
he similarly rejected the second prong of the strict scrutiny standard
and apparently substituted in its place a test of reasonableness. 2 U
Justice Stevens's opinions in Wygant and Paradise seem entirely
consistent with the core principles of the liberal camp Justices.
Although he did not take the identical jurisprudential path they
did, he ultimately voted for the same result. His opinions further
resemble those of the liberal camp Justices because they too have
the effect of encouraging the voluntary adoption of race/gender-
conscious programs by employers and the ordering of such relief
by the district courts following a trial on the merits.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume Justice Stevens's
complete subscription to the core principles of the liberal camp.
Even in Wygant he made it quite clear that he was not abandoning
his position in Fullilove. Justice Stevens applauded the Jackson
School District's layoff plan "in striking contrast to the procedural
inadequacy and unjustified breadth of the race-based classification
in Fullilove v. Klutznick ."212 That he specifically included this
language suggests the possibility of an institutional instability in
future cases much greater than a mere tallying of his recent votes
might suggest. Many public and private sector employers have been
quite casual in benefitting virtually all minority group members in
their race-conscious plans. 2 " Especially in light of his already eclec-
21° 107 S. Ct. at 1079 n.4 and id. at 1078 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
211 Id. at 1078.
212 106 S. Ct. at 1870 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ;
213 In his Fullilove dissent Justice Stevens commented:
Indeed, the broad racial classification in this Act is totally unexplained. Although
the legislative history discussed by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and by MR. JUSTICE
POWELL explains why Negro citizens are included within the preferred class,
there is absolutely no discussion of why Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, and Aleuts were also included.
448 U.S. at 550 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a spirited defense of Congress's selection
of these groups, see Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique,
17 HARv. C.R.-C.L, L. REV. 503, 546-47 (1982). The Alabama Supreme Court struck down
a Birmingham ordinance modeled on the federal statute because the municipality offered
no proof that any group other than Blacks were entitled to remedial relief. Arrington v.
Associated Gen. Contractors, 403 So. 2d 893, 903 (Ala. 1981).
The question concerning which minorities should benefit from race-conscious programs
remains unanswered. For example, the MBE provision in Fullilove included all Spanish-
speaking citizens, 448 U.S. at 459. The minority set-aside in Bakke limited its preference to
"Chicanos" (i.e., Mexican Americans); all other Hispanics were ineligible. 438 U.S. at 274—
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tic jurisprudence, Justice Stevens's reference to the "unjustified
breadth" of the Fullilove plan may foreshadow a negative vote in
future affirmative action cases.
b. Justice Stevens and Title VII
What has just been said about Justice Stevens's nonconformist
approach to the equal protection clause can equally be said of his
Title VII jurisprudence. As noted earlier, Justice Stevens did not
participate in Weber. In Local 28, he joined Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion, but did not write separately. In Stotts, he distanced
himself from the liberal camp Justices by refusing to join justice
Blackmun's dissent, which by implication approved race-conscious
layoffs under certain circumstances. Although Justice Stevens ac-
tually voted with a coalition of conservative camp Justices to reverse
the district court's injunction ordering race-conscious layoffs to pre-
serve minority hiring, he also distanced himself from the conser-
vative camp Justices by refusing to join Justice White's majority
opinion. He filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. That
opinion focused on a narrow, non-Title VII issue, the district court's
improper issuance of a preliminary injunction. 214
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion' in Johnson also reflects the
uncertain dynamic of his jurisprudence. The opinion is an odd
mixture of restraint and activism. On the one hand, he acknowl-
edged his belief that Weber was wrongly decided. 2 ' 5 On the other
hand, believing himself bound by stare decisis, he went far beyond
Weber (arid Bakke) by maintaining that an employer is free to adopt
a race/gender-conscious affirmative action plan for just about any
reason at all. While Justices Brennan and O'Connor debate the
quantum of proof an employer needs before implementing such a
program, Justice Stevens would do away with the requirement al-
together! Urging the Court to adopt a sweeping interpretation of
Weber, he argued:
I see no reason why the employer has any duty, prior to
granting a preference to a qualified minority employee,
to determine whether his past conduct might constitute
76. The layoff provision in Wygani applied to "employees ... of Spanish descendancy." 106
S. Ct. at 1845 n.2. In other words, if A, a citizen of Irish descent and B, a citizen of Puerto
Rican descent, were the parents of C, who never learned to speak Spanish, C would qualify
only for the Wygant preference.
2 ' 4 467 U.S. at 590-92.
2j5
 107 S. Ct. at 1458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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an arguable violation of Title VII. Indeed, in some in-
stances the employer may find it more helpful to focus on
the future. Instead of retroactively scrutinizing his own or
society's possible exclusions of minorities in the past to
determine the outer limits of a valid affirmative-action
program — or indeed, any particular affirmative-action
decision — in many cases the employer will find it more
appropriate to consider other legitimate reasons to give
preferences to members of under-represented groups. 216
Even more surprising than his dismissal of the factual predicate
requirement are the reasons Justice Stevens suggests to justify an
employer's decision: to provide better services to black citizens, to
prevent racial tension, to enhance diversity, or to eliminate a system
of racial caste. 217 It is hard to imagine that these suggestions come
from the same Justice who decried the distribution of benefits along
racial lines in Fuililove.218
After Johnson, there is strong temptation in analyzing Justice
Stevens's Title VII jurisprudence to rank him with Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun in the liberal camp. Certainly, the
principles enunciated in Johnson are congruent with the core prin-
ciples of the liberal camp Justices. His arguments even extend be-
yond the parameters of liberal camp opinions by acknowledging a
virtually unchecked discretion in public and private sector employ-
ers concerning the motives that prompt their adoption of race/
gender-conscious programs.
Temptations are meant to be resisted, however, and this one
should be no different. The troubling fact remains that even in
Johnson, Justice Stevens expressed the belief that Weber was wrongly
decided. Although Justice Stevens represented that he would con-
tinue "to adhere to an authoritative construction of the Act that is
at odds with my understanding of the actual intent of the authors
of the legislation," 219 the certainty of that outcome is not wholly free
from doubt. If presented with a powerful enough case in which a
public employer acted with the same "procedural inadequacy and
unjustified breadth of the race-based classification" as Congress
acted in Fullilove, Justice Stevens might well reconsider and with-
draw his support for Weber. Although his opinion in fohnson suggests
716 Id. at 1460 (Stevens, J., concurring).
217
218 448 U.S. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219 107 S. Ct. at 1459 (Stevens, J.. concurring).
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that this is not a likely occurrence, it cannot be ruled out entirely
given the maverick character of Justice Stevens's overall affirmative
action jurisprudence.
D. Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor: The Court's Free Agents
As the case analysis contained in Part 11 demonstrates, Justice
Powell and Justice O'Connor share a highly nuanced jurisprudence
of affirmative action, which escapes the "liberal/conservative" des-
ignation. Their irregular voting patterns, coupled with their prac-
tice of writing concurring opinions to supplement majority or plu-
rality opinions, has incontrovertibly contributed to the Court's
institutional instability. The uncertainty with which they approach
race/gender-conscious relief is not a sign of intellectual skittishness,
however. It is quite the opposite. They are more willing than other
members of the Court to grapple with the legal and moral ambiv-
alence surrounding this issue. Their opinions are an acknowledg-
ment of an ongoing struggle.
Although these Justices share an absence of firm allegiance to
either the liberal or conservative framework, it would be a mistake
to assume that their concerns are identical. For Justice Powell, the
overriding questions have always been why was the race/gender-
conscious program adopted and what is its impact on the affected
non-minority applicant or employee who is competing For the job
or promotion? Although not insensitive to these concerns, Justice
O'Connor has addressed two very different issues: harmonization
of the strict scrutiny and intermediate tests and the character of the
evidence needed by a public employer as a factual predicate before
implementing a race/gender-conscious affirmative action program.
1. Justice Powell and the Protection of Non-Minority Interests: A
"Moderate" Contribution
Justice Powell's opinions in Bakke and Wygant make clear, as
noted earlier, that an employer's desire to correct societal discrim-
ination will never pass constitutional muster. Correcting societal
discrimination with its subsidiary goal of providing role models is
simply "too amorphous ... insufficient and over expansive." 220 Ac-
cording to Justice Powell, an employer may act only to correct its
own discrimination. A formal finding of discrimination is not nec-
2" Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848 (opinion o1 l'owell, J.).
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essary, however. "Nome showing of prior discrimination" will suf-
fice. 221
Even if the factual predicate is sufficient, Justice Powell's vote
is not guaranteed. The second question, directed to impact, must
also be satisfactorily answered. Central to Justice Powell's jurispru-
dence is the view that, although coworkers and competing appli-
cants may be asked to share the burden of affirmative action, their
interests may not be entirely extinguished. The difference between
"sharing" and "extinction" is more than a verbal sleight-of-hand
and explains why he voted to strike down the plans in Bakke and
Wygant and to uphold the plans in Fullilove, Local 28, and Paradise.
In Bakke, the medical school set aside sixteen of the one
hundred seats exclusively for minority applicants. In Wygant, the
school district automatically laid off more experienced white teach-
ers while retaining minority teachers with less seniority. No matter
how good a white teacher might be, that individual was subject to
layoff in order to maintain racial parity. 222 In each case, the burden
of the affirmative action plan completely extinguished any interest
of competing non-minority members. In Justice Powell's jurispru-
dence, that impact was simply too draconian.
In contrast, in Fullilove, vast sums of money remained available
in both the public and private sectors for non-minority construction
firms. 223 In Local 28 and Paradise, no non-minority applicants or
employees were completely excluded from apprenticeship or pro-
motion opportunities. 224 Thus, from Justice Powell's perspective,
the non-minority group members in these cases were "sharing" the
burden, not bearing its brunt.
A less obvious thread connecting his views in these cases con-
cerns the culpability of the defendant. Neither Bakke nor Wygant
involved a finding or admission of prior discrimination. 225 On the
other hand, in Local 28226 and Paradise,227 the defendants had dis-
played a lengthy and deliberate hostility to the district courts' re-
22 ' Id. at 1847.
222 Cf. id. at 1844-46,1849-50.
223 448 U.S. at 510-15 (Powell,,]., concurring).
•	 22' Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1075-76 (Powell, J., concurring); Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3054
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
225 Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10 (opinion of Powell, J.) with Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at
1848-49.
226 106 S. Ct. at 3025-32.
227 1 07 S. Ct. at 1058-64.
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medial orders, which were themselves predicated upon the defen-
dants' wholesale resistance to Title VII and the equal protection
clause, respectively. In both cases, justice Powell repeatedly drew
attention to the defendants' egregious conduct; he duly noted the
absence of such conduct in Bakke and Wygant. 228
 In Fullilove, he
commented extensively on the evidence of government discrimi-
nation which Congress had available to it while enacting the MBE
legislation. 22• The cases suggest that Justice Powell may have toler-
ated a greater degree of impact on "innocent" non-minority group
members in instances in which the defendant had been overtly
hostile to the applicable antidiscrimination norm and to judicial
efforts to assure compliance and procure remedial action.
In terms of the degree of impact, Justice Powell's jurisprudence
recognizes a distinction among hiring goals, promotion goals, and
layoff provisions. He is least troubled by hiring goals because they
"impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several
opportunities ... ."2 " He is most troubled by layoffs because they
"impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives." 281
Promotion goals fall somewhere in the middle. Precisely where they
fall is a function of other conditions. Justice Powell has considered
questions such as do the plans entirely foreclose promotion oppor-
tunities? How long will they be in place? Do they advance unqual-
ified workers? In Paradise, for example, Justice Powell carefully
noted in his concurring opinion that the one-time quota benefitted
only qualified blacks, that it did not deny non-minority troopers the
chance to compete for promotions, and that it was "uncertain
whether any individual trooper, white or black, would have achieved
a different rank, or would have achieved it at a different time, but
225 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1844-48; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300-05.
229 448 U.S. at 499-506 (Powell, J., concurring).
106 S. Ct. at 1851-52; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct., at 3056-57 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell has cautioned, however:
Mt is too simplistic to conclude from the combined holdings in Wygant and this
case that hiring goals withstand constitutional muster whereas layoff goals and
fixed quotas do not. There inay be cases, for example, where a hiring goal in a
particularly specialized area of employment would have the same pernicious
effect as the layoff goal in li):gant. The propel; constitutional inquiry focuses
on the effect, if any, and the diffuseness of the burden imposed on innocent
notiminorities, not on the label applied to the particular employment plan at
issue.
id. at 3057 n.3.
191
 Wygane, 106 S. Ct. at 1851.
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for the promotion requirement." 292 Hence, he found the burden
on non-minority troopers acceptable.
In light of Justice Powell's repeated, expressed concerns re-
garding the "why" of the affirmative action plan and its impact, his
silence in Johnson is quite perplexing. Prior to that case, he had
expressed his views on these issues in almost every single case. Why
not Johnson? In announcing his retirement at the end of the 1986
Term, Justice Powell commented upon his frail health. 233 Perhaps
because Johnson so acutely raised the difficult, fundamental issues
that had managed to escape review before, Justice Powell was unable
to muster the intellectual and emotional commitment necessary to
resolve them. Here was a case that might have prompted a younger,
more vigorous Justice Powell to re-examine, repudiate, or reaffirm
Bakke's key concept of race/gender as a non-determinative "plus."
Depending on how you read the lower court record in Johnson
— Justice Scalia read it one way and Justice Brennan the other way
— Joyce's sex was either the reason why she was promoted or simply
a "plus," one of many variables the selecting official considered in
making his final decision. The fact that the district court had made
a factual finding that Joyce's sex was "the determining factor"234 fur-
ther complicated the case. Moreover, the two candidates had almost
equal qualifications; they ranked first and second on the selection
list, separated by a mere two points. It would have been difficult
for Justice Powell to conclude, like Justice Scalia, that Joyce,.because
of the difference of two points, was "unqualified." Perhaps in his
view their close rank also deflated Justice Scalia's argument that
affirmative action plans encourage the promotion of "minimally
qualified" employees of the underrepresented race or gender. 235
Undoubtedly, Justice Powell was also acutely aware of the very
practical problems raised in Johnson, which prompted the filing of
numerous amicus briefs. In at least two respects, the county's plan
was typical of affirmative action plans adopted nationwide by public
employers at municipal, county, and state levels. First, the plan
232 107 S. Ct. at 1076 (Powell, J., concurring).
"3 N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at I, col. 6.
2" 107 S. Ct. at 1469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2" ld. at 1474-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He was certainly aware of the difficulties inher-
ent in merit selection procedures. It is almost impossible for many employers to satisfy the
federal guidelines concerning the validation of employment tests. See Uniform Guidelines
on Employer Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1988); see also E. POTTER, EMPLOYEE
SELECTION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION (2d ed.
1986).
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rested on a general imbalance between the race/gender make-up of
the work force and that of the labor pool, not on refined statistical
analysis. Second, it relied on personnel managers and affirmative
action coordinators to put teeth into the plan by judging the per-
formance of the selecting official in terms of how well he or she
met the affirmative action plan's targets. Invalidation of the plan,
it was feared, would jeopardize thousands of other plans across the
country, unsettling employment expectations of whites and blacks
alike."6 As a centrist, a moderate, and a pragmatist, Justice Powell
could not be insensitive to these fears. 2"
Nor could he be insensitive to the views of numerous organi-
zations that filed amicus briefs on behalf of private employers.
Claiming reliance on Weber in adopting similar plans, these orga-
nizations maintained that such plans made equal employment op-
portunity for women and minorities a reality rather than a social
shibboleth.38 Public and private sector briefs uniformly expressed
the belief that, without race-conscious hiring and promotion deci-
sions, minority integration into the mainstream of the American
economy would have been severely handicapped in the twenty-odd
years following the passage of Title VII.
In reviewing the briefs in Johnson, Justice Powell undoubtedly
reflected on his experiences in successfully overseeing the peaceful
integration of Richmond, Virginia's segregated school system and
improving the educational opportunities of minority students, first
as a member, and then as president, of the Virginia State Board of
Education. Those experiences most certainly deepened his appre-
ciation of the value of steady, non-confrontational advances by mi-
"6 Brief of the National League of Cities, National Ass'n of Counties, U.S. Conference
or Mayors, and Intl City Management Ass'n, as Amid Curiae in Support of Respondents at
2-3, 11-12, Johnson (No. 85-1129); see Brief of the State of Cal., Cal. Fair Emp. & Housing
Comin'n, States of Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York,
Oregon, Wisconsin, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, at 1-2, 3-4, 6-8. Johnson (No. 85-1129); U.S, CONFERENCE or
MAYORS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS IN CITY GOVERNMENTS (1986).
Similar arguments were made in Paradise. See, e.g., Brief of City of Detroit, The District
of Columbia and the City of Los Angeles as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2—
4, 20-23, Paradise (No. 85.999).
237 For an insightful examination of Justice Powell's jurisprudence analyzed by one of
his former clerks, see Whitman, Individual and Community: An Appreciation of Mr. Justice Powell,
68 VA. L. Rev. 303 (1982); cf. Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70
Mimi. L. Rev. 445 (1972); Urofsky, Mr. justice Powell and Education: The Balancing of Competing
Values, 13 J.L. & Elmo. 581 (1984).
"' Brief of Arnicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel at 5, 6, 8-16,
Johnson (No. 85-1 120).
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norities. The prospect of the Supreme Court's abolition of affir-
mative action programs must have appeared to him as a step
backwards in race-relations, one certain to provoke confrontation
and conflict among minority and non-minority employees, unions,
and employers. This result would be wholly anathema to Justice
Powell's concept of a lawful, orderly integration of American society.
By refusing to put the determinative gloss on Justice Harlan's
cry for a color-blind Constitution and, by extension, a color-blind
Tide VII, Justice Powell's contribution to the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence has been both a malediction and a blessing: a
malediction because it contributed to its institutional instability; a
blessing because it represented an ongoing struggle at the highest
level of intellect to insure equal justice under law.
2. Justice O'Connor: Vacillation or Reconciliation?
When Justice O'Connor joined the Supreme Court, the essen-
tial doctrines of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence had
already crystallized. Weber, Bakke, and Fullilove were Supreme Court
law and lore. It is obvious that affirmative action issues have sparked
Justice O'Connor's interest. She has written separately to explain
her views in each of the six cases subsequent to Weber, Bakke, and
Fullilove. In four cases, she voted expressly against the race/gender-
conscious plans. 239 In the remaining two cases, she voted in favor
of the plan, but significantly qualified her approval in concurring
opinions. 240 Although these statistics suggest a more negative than
positive view toward affirmative action, it would be a mistake to
describe her jurisprudence as "conservative." Certainly, it is not
conservative in the same sense as that term has been used in this
article to describe the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and White.
On a surface level, Justice O'Connor's opinions appear to vac-
illate. Mature study, however, shows them to be open-textured re-
flections and elaborations on pre-existing doctrines. Reconciliation
of the Justices' differing views is her primary motif. Given that she
has not ventured out on her own to suggest new doctrines, her
23 ' Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1080 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3057
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1852 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Sinus, 467 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
24"Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); City of Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. at 3080 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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jurisprudence is best examined against the backdrop of the core
principles of the liberal and conservative camps.
a. Points of Convergence and Divergence with the Core
Principles of the Conservative and Liberal Camp Justices
As noted earlier, the conservative camp Justices reject the re-
mediation of societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate for
race/gender-conscious plans, limiting a public sector employer to
correcting the vestiges of its own discrimination. To the extent the
conservative Justices accept the concept of a voluntary plan at all,
they insist upon proof demonstrating a "manifest imbalance in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories" in Title VII cases and proof
demonstrating "a strong basis in evidence" in equal protection cases.
Finally, in the case of a public sector employer, the conservative
Justices subject all such plans to a strict scrutiny standard of review.
The principles animating Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence
both converge and diverge with these axioms. She too rejects re-
mediation of societal discrimination as an acceptable predicate for
public sector remedial efforts irrespective of the identity of the
antidiscrimination norm at issue. 241 But Justice O'Connor has also
very pointedly withheld endorsing the corollary view that remedia-
tion of an employer's own discrimination is the only acceptable
predicate. Her opinions admit the possibility of other permissible
predicates, such as the need for an integrated faculty. 242 In this
respect, her views are doctrinally closer to those of the "Brennan"
group Justices in Bakke and Justice Stevens in Wygant and Johnson,
who have endorsed the statutory and constitutional validity of other
predicates.
As represented by Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson,
to the extent that the conservative camp Justices acknowledge the
right of a public sector employer to implement a race/gender-con-
scious plan in the absence of a formal finding of discrimination,
they rigorously insist that the employer have hard evidence of its
own discriminatory conduct. 243 Justice O'Connor also subscribes to
this view, but as her opinions in Johnson and Wygant illustrate, her
analysis is nuanced, ultimately making her more accepting of the
statutory and constitutional validity of these plans.
24 ' Wygqnt, 106 S. Ct. at 1854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
242 Id. at 1859 n.*.
242 107 S. Ct. at 1469-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In her opinion concurring in the judgment in Johnson, Justice
O'Connor emphatically rejected any suggestion of a different stan-
dard for evaluating reverse discrimination claims under Title VII
and the equal protection clause. She insisted that a public sector
employer could adopt a voluntary plan only if it possessed evidence
of "a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie claim
under Title VII." 244
 Thus, she rejected the majority's gloss on Weber,
which called simply for evidence of a "manifest imbalance." Her
standard was much higher and rested on Hazelwood."'
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Johnson shows how great the
doctrinal gap between the conservative and liberal camp Justices is,
and, at the same time, how she steers a middle course between the
two. Like the conservative camp Justices, Justice O'Connor criticized
the majority's approach as "expansive and ill-defined." Accordingly,
she rejected the reliance on general labor pool statistics, substituting
a much more refined analysis that looked to the gender composition
of the skilled craft workers in the local labor pool. That analysis
yielded a 5% female figure. Because the county's craft work force
was all male, she concluded that there was a statistical imbalance
sufficient to support a prima facie Title VII case; therefore, she
concurred in the judgment accepting the plaintiff's claim of gender
discrimination. 246
 This analysis, of course, was far more rigorous
than the majority's and represented a much more restrictive view
of Weber. But it was also far more lenient than Justice Scalia's dissent,
which attributed the absence of women to societal discrimination
and not to the employer's conduct.
Wygant is an even more striking example of how resolutely
Justice O'Connor's treatment of the factual predicate issue steers a
middle course. She specifically declined to join Part IV of Justice
Powell's opinion, which struck down the layoff provision as not
"sufficiently narrowly tailored." In her view, Justice Powell's conclu-
244 Id. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
245
 In examining a race/gender-conscious plan's factual predicate, justice O'Connor often
weaves in strands of the conservative camp's core principles. For example, in Paradise, she
condemned the district court's selection of the 50/50, black/white promotion quantum because
it "far exceeded the percentage of blacks in the trooper force." 107 S. Ct. at 1081. Her
condemnation of the ratio, in turn, rested on the need to protect "the rights of nonminority
troopers," and she faulted the district court for not "first considering the effectiveness of
alternatives that would have a lesser effect on the rights of nonminority troopers." Id. at
1082. In Johnson, too, she emphasized that the important interest underlying the factual
predicate analysis was "the congressional intent to provide some measure of protection to
the interests of the employer's nonminority employees." 107 S. Ct. at 1461.
245 Id. at 1463-65.
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sion was correct, but his reasoning was wrong: correct, because the
plan failed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test; wrong,
because it was the lack of an accurate labor pool comparison in the
underlying hiring plan that precluded the plan from being "ad-
judged 'narrowly tailored' to effect its asserted remedial pur-
pose."247 Although she joined the conservative camp Justices in
voting to strike down the plan, Justice O'Connor left open the
possibility that a race/gender-conscious layoff plan might be per-
missible and that other predicates beyond remediation of the em-
ployer's own discrimination might be acceptable. 248
Fundamental to the core principles of the conservative camp is
the insistence that racial classifications, whether benefitting or stig-
matizing minority group members, are so inherently pernicious that
they can be judged by no standard less rigorous than the strict
scrutiny,test. Justice O'Connor has put herself solidly in the con-
servative camp by unequivocally endorsing this proposition. What
sets her jurisprudence apart, however, are her repeated attempts
to reconcile the divided views of the Justices on this point:
In the final analysis, the diverse formulations and the
number of separate writings put forth by various members
of the Court in these difficult cases do not necessarily
reflect an intractable fragmentation in opinion with re-
spect to certain core principles. Ultimately, the Court is at
least in accord in believing that a public employer, consis-
tent with the Constitution, may undertake an affirmative
action program which is designed to further a legitimate
remedial purpose and which implements that purpose by
means that do not impose disproportionate harm on the
interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent
individuals directly and adversely affected by a plan's ra-
cial preference. 24°
As noted earlier, two concerns underlie the liberal camp's ju-
risprudence: first, the integration of minority group members into
the mainstream of the American economy, and second, the pro-
motion of voluntary resolutions of race/gender disputes. Justice
O'Connor's opinions do not directly address the first concern of
integrating minorities into the mainstream. 250 In contrast to their
20
 106 S. Ct. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
2" id. at 1857.
2" 107 S. Ct. at 1081 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2" In Stotts, however, she explored a related concern, relief for non-victims. The two
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relative silence on the economic integration concern, her opinions
contain repeated references to the importance of voluntary reso-
lutions of claims of face Or gender discrimination."' Inexorably
intertwined with her emphasis on voluntary settlements is the re-
luctance to require a formal finding of discrimination as a statutory
or constitutional prerequisite to the voluntary adoption of a race/
gender-conscious program:
The imposition of a requirement that public employers
make findings that they hav'e engaged in illegal discrimi-
nation before they engage in affirmative action programs
would severely underinine public employers' incentive to
meet voluntarily their civil right's obligations .... This
result would clearly be at odds with this Court's and Con-
gress' consistent emphasis on "the value of voluntary ef-
forts to further the objectives of the law . ..." The value
of voluntary compliance is doubly important when it is a
public employer that acts, both because of the example its
voluntary assumption of responsibility sets and because
the remediatibn of governmental discrimination is of
unique importance." 2
As this statement suggests, justice O'Connor is among the group of
Justices referred to in Part II for whom the value of "voluntarism"
significantly colors her review of the underlying substantive is-
sues.253
One final measure of the jurisprudential differences between
the liberal camp Justices and Justice O'Connor may be seen in her
explanation for selecting the prima facie standard. In her view, such
a standard is necessary to effectuate "the congressional intent to
concerns are linked because non-victim relief also serves as an economic integration tool,
speeding the entry of minorities into better paying jobs with greater prospects of advance-
ment. If Title VII relief were limited to actual victims, fewer minorities would gain these
benefits. In Stotts, she specifically endorsed the dicta in Justice White's majority opinion
restricting race-conscious relief to actual victims of discrimination. 467 U.S. at 586-90 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring). Her agreement that Title VII limited remedial relief in this fashion is,
of course, thematically consistent with the conservative camp's repeated citations to Congress's
intent in enacting Title VII. When a majority of the Court later abandoned that Stotts dicta
in Local 28 in favor of class-wide relief, she upbraided their decision. She did not, however,
take specific issue with Justice Brennan's majority/plurality opinion which argued that such
relief was necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of discrimination or to remedy the
egregious behavior of the defendant union.
"I E.g., Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1463 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Wygant,
106 S. Ct. at 1855-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
252 Id. at 1855 (citations omitted).
233 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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provide some measure of protection to the interests of the employ-
er's nonminority employees . . ""4 Liberal camp opinions empha-
size Congress's intent to bring minorities into the mainstream of
the American economy. 255 Although neither concern flatly contra-
dicts the other, the focus of their comments does illuminate the
very sharp difference in their approach to race/gender-conscious
programs.
b. The Future Direction of Justice O'Connor's Affirmative Action
Jurisprudence
In sum, Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence reflects the concerns
underlying the core principles of both the liberal and conservative
camps. Like the conservative camp Justices, she rejects societal dis-
crimination as a substitute for an employer-specific factual predi-
cate, endorses the strict scrutiny test, and insists upon the more
restrictive prima facie, Hazelwood standard under both Tide VII and
the equal protection clause. At the same time, however, Justice
O'Connor is not unsympathetic to the core principles of the liberal
camp. "Voluntarism" is almost as much an affirmative action virtue
for her as it is for Justice Brennan. Although unwilling to give
public sector employers as much leeway as Justice Brennan in es-
tablishing a factual predicate and in constructing the plan's per-
centage requirement, she is far from overtly hostile to the need for
such programs.
As noted at the beginning of this discussion, Justice O'Connor
joined the Court after Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove had been decided
and at a time when the Court had been vigorously criticized for its
inability to achieve even a semblance of a coherent jurisprudence.
Her frequent opinion writing in this area, with its motifs of recon-
ciliation and harmonization, is a response to this criticism. Her
extended analysis of the factual predicate issue reflects her concern
for the Court's institutional responsibility to all the affirmative ac-
tion players: the lower courts, employers, unions, and minority and
non-minority employees and applicants. The tenor of her opinions
suggests that Justice O'Connor has written separately in each case
to help interested institutions and individuals avoid statutory and
constitutional pitfalls in an area of the law where few principles are
free from doubt. Her appreciation for the Court's institutional re-
254 Jahnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1461; cf. Paradise, 107 S. CI- at 1081.
2" E.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-04.
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sponsibilities is also reflected in her extended commentary on the
standard of review to be applied to race/gender-conscious employ-
ment decisions under the equal protection clause.
Justice O'Connor has been a vigorous player in the affirmative
action ballpark. Rather than join one camp or the other on a per-
manent basis, she has preferred to remain a free agent. Her rec-
ognition of the values supporting the two camp's jurisprudence has,
of course, contributed to the Court's jurisprudential instability, and
is likely to continue to do so in the future. This comment, however,
is simply a conclusion and not a criticism. Justice O'Connor, like
Justice Powell, is a "free agent" not because of ideological fickleness,
but because the core principles of the two camps represent impor-
tant values that on occasion may be irreconcilable. Justice O'Connor
has assumed the difficult task of forging a unified body of legal
axioms from nine ambiguous, contradictory, and incohesive cases
decided by a divided Court. That she has not been entirely suc-
cessful does not undermine her prospects of success in the future.
The nonaligned character of her jurisprudence makes her an ideal
"play-maker" for the next nine innings.
E. Justice Kennedy: A Key Player Without A Track Record
As the foregoing analysis demonstrated, Justice Powell's vote
was critical in each of the eight reverse discrimination cases in which
he participated. The Justice's pivotal role was obviously in the fore-
front of the Reagan Administration's concerns in searching for his
successor. Judge Bork's writings leave no doubt that if he had been
confirmed by the Senate, he would have supported the core prin-
ciples of the conservative camp. 256
In contrast to Judge Bork, Judge Kennedy emerged from the
Senate confirmation proceedings as a "centrist" and a "moderate." 2"
Although the overall tenor of his jurisprudence provides a great
deal of support for this conclusion, his opinions as a circuit judge
do not shed any light on his views concerning affirmative action.
Nor do his votes or opinions during his first term on the Court give
any insight into how he might approach the issues discussed in this
article.
2" E.g., Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
823 (1986); Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 So. I'm L.J. 383 (1985); Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I (1971).
257 E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1988, at AI0, col. I; N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1987, at I, col.
2; Marcotte, Bork to Ginsberg to Kennedy, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1988, at 15; Williams, The Opinions of
Anthony Kennedy: No Time for Ideology, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 56.
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Although he sat on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
for twelve years, Justice Kennedy did not hear any significant ap-
peals in employment discrimination cases involving the equal pro-
tection clause. 258
 He has authored only one major Title VII decision.
In American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO (AFSCME) v. Washington,m writing for a unanimous panel, he
rejected a comparable worth challenge to the public employer's
wage structure under Tide VII. According to comparable worth
theorists, gender-based discrimination results if jobs traditionally
held by women are paid less than jobs traditionally held by men,
where the jobs are of equal value to the employer. Finding both the
disparate treatment and disparate impact models of liability in-
applicable, Justice Kennedy concluded that the public employer's
"initial reliance on a free market system in which employees in
male-dominated jobs are compensated at a higher rate than em-
"' In general, Justice Kennedy has written few decisions involving the equal protection
clause. The one case that did receive some notoriety in the course of the Senate confirmation
hearings was Spangler v. Pasadena, 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979). In that case, the district
court had denied a school board's request to end its continuing supervision of the district's
desegregation efforts. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial. Justice Kennedy
wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing the Supreme Court's repeated insistence in deseg-
regation cases on the principle "that when a court ordered remedy has accomplished its
purpose, jurisdiction should terminate." Id. at 1242. Although some critics of his nomination
charged this opinion demonstrated an insensitivity to the plight of racial minorities, their
criticism seems unwarranted in light of his correct reading of the Supreme Court's doctrine
and further comments he made in the opinion warning the school district of the possibility
of new lawsuits if it acted unconstitutionally in pupil assignments.
Other unrelated opinions detract from any charge of insensitivity. E.g., Aranda v. Van
Sickle, 600 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (section 1983 challenge
to at-large election scheme brought by Mexican-American voters); Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d
1386 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion by Kennedy, J., affirming a finding of section 1983 liability
against city officers who had delayed issuance of liquor license to Mexican-Americans because
of their race and/or national origin).
The single other case cited by critics as evidence of insensitivity is TOPIC v. Circle Realty,
532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976), in which Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous panel,
concluded that civil rights "testers" lacked standing to sue real estate brokers under Section
3612 of the Fair Housing Act. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Powell,
later reached the opposite conclusion in Gladstone v. Ball, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
2" 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). Only one other Title VII case received any attention
during Justice Kennedy's confirmation hearings. That case is not even remotely illuminating
on the question of the propriety of race/gender-conscious hiring and promotion provisions
in affirmative action plans. In Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
in an en bane decision that the defendant's policy of requiring female flight attendants to
observe strict weight requirements violated Title VII. Justice Kennedy and four of his
colleagues joined in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Farris. The opinion argued that
the majority improperly decided the liability issue and should have ordered a remand for a
trial on the merits.
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ployees in dissimilar female-dominated jobs is not in and of itself a
violation of Title VII." 260 Although proponents of the comparable
worth doctrine have criticized his opinion, no serious argument can
be raised that it evidences any biases toward women or hostility
toward Title VII. No court — other than the district court in Amer-
ican Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
(AFSCME) — has ever interpreted Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination to include liability premised upon the compara-
ble worth doctrine.
Although the absence of any relevant Title VII or equal pro-
tection clause cases makes prognostication more risky, the overall
tenor of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence suggests that he is well-
suited to take Justice Powell's place in the Supreme Court line-up.
Repeatedly described as a moderate and a centrist in the Senate
confirmation hearings, he is unlikely to heed the extreme call for
the overruling of Weber, which would unsettle employment practices
throughout the public and private sector. He is likely to accept race/
gender-conscious programs as being in the "spirit" of Title VII and
the equal- protection clause, thereby aligning himself in the liberal
camp with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. On the other
hand, he may well be sympathetic to Justice O'Connor's insistence
on a refined statistical predicate for the plan's goals and Justice
White's solicitude for the legitimate employment expectations of
innocent white employees.
IV. TOWARD THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THREE
SUGGESTIONS TO REPAIR A FRACTURED JURISPRUDENCE
Given the general instability in the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence and the ideological divisions of the Justices, it is
obvious that the future validity of race/gender-conscious plans
adopted by public sector employers is far from settled. Part IV
offers three suggestions to repair the Court's fractured jurispru-
dence.
A. The Court Should Reaffirm Weber in an Opinion Unmarred by
Ambiguity and Should Symmetrize its Title VII and Equal Protection
Clause Jurisprudence
As noted earlier, the three dissenting Justices in Johnson have
called upon the Court to overrule Weber. Their plea should be
26G 770 F.2d at 1408.
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rejected. Overruling Weber would be flatly inconsistent with the
controlling principles of the doctrine of stare decisis. It would also
profoundly contradict the "spirit" of Title VII which the Court
correctly invoked in Weber to carry out Congress's intent.
Stare decisis is the doctrine that once a court has determined
that a particular principle is applicable to a given state of facts, it
should continue to apply that principle in all future cases to facts
that are substantially the same. Stare decisis exists to give stability
and predictability to the law — virtues conspicuously absent from
the Court's reverse discrimination jurisprudence. As Justice Bran-
deis observed in a frequently quoted passage, "[s]tare decisis is usually
the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 26 '
Notwithstanding the Court's acknowledgment of the doctrine's
importance, it has constructed one or two escape hatches to permit
judicial unsettling of previously established case law. The Court
draws a distinction between cases resting on statutory interpretation
and those resting on constitutional interpretation. It strongly dis-
favors correcting errors of statutory interpretation, preferring to
leave that task to Congress. Justice Harlan best expressed this view
when he said: "[I]t must appear beyond doubt from the legislative
history of the . . . statute that [the Court] misapprehended the
meaning of the controlling provision, before a departure from what
was decided in those cases would be justified." 262 While hardly eager
to overturn cases resting on constitutional interpretation, the Court
grants itself more leeway because "correction through legislative
action is practically impossible."263
Applied to the question at hand, these interpretative principles
clearly blunt the force of the appeal to overrule Weber. Given both
?In Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). The Court will have an extended opportunity to review the doctrine of stare
decisis this Term in deciding Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987) (No. 87-107). A major issue in that case is whether
the Court should overrule Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), a seminal civil rights
case, which interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as outlawing private acts of discrimination in
contracting.
262 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (14arlan, J., concurring) (footnote deleted;
emphasis added). Mr. Justice White has similarly insisted that "in a statutory case, a partic-
ularly strong showing is required that [the Court] misread the relevant statute and its history."
Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 517 (1982) (White, J.,
concurring).
26 ' Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406-07 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); accord Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 33 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-66 (1944).
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Congress's failure to act in the almost ten years since Weber and its
awareness of race/gender-conscious plans when it amended Title
VII in 1972,264 it most certainly does not "appear beyond doubt" that
Weber was wrongly decided. Congress's inaction respecting Weber,
moreover, contrasts sharply with its willingness to overrule other
civil rights decisions by the Court involving issues of statutory con-
struction during the same period. 265
 Congress's inaction subsequent
to Weber clearly supports the proposition "that the interpretation of
the Act . . . has legislative approval." 266
Furthermore, overruling Weber would undermine the law's
need for stability and predictability. As Chief justice Rehnquist, one
of the doctrine's staunchest supporters has observed: "In all cases,
private parties shape their conduct according to this Court's settled
construction of the law . . . . Only the most compelling circum-
stances can justify •
 this Court's abandonment of such firmly estab-
lished statutory precedents." 267
 As mentioned earlier, literally tens
2"
 By 1972, several courts had ordered race-conscious hiring and promotion relief to
remedy employment discrimination. In addition, two courts in well publicized cases had
upheld race-conscious hiring and prOmotion goals imposed upon federal contractors pur-
suant to E.O. 11246. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 .
 U.S. 854 (1971). During the course of debate on the 1972 amendments,
Senator Ervin proposed two separate amendments to overturn these decisions. Senator Javits,
the floor manager for the bill under consideration, vigorously opposed their adoption,
arguing that the amendments would emasculate E.O. 11246 and "deprive the courts of the
opportunity to order affirmative action under Title VII of the type which they have sustained
in order to correct a history of unjust and illegal discrimination ...." 118 CONG. REC. 1665
(1972). Ultimately, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected both amendments. Id. at 1676, 4917–
18. Although it is difficult to know how much weight this incident should be given, it certainly
reflects Congress's awareness of race-conscious remedies. An intelligent — but not over-
whelming — argument for congressional approval rests on the proposals rejected by the
Senate in 1972. It is interesting to note in passing that the contractors subject to E.O. 11246
formulate their goals and timetables based on underrepresentation of women and minorities
in their labor force. Thus, these plans resemble the one adopted by the Santa Clara Trans-
portation Agency and approved by the Supreme Court in Johnson.
266
	 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000d, overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)); Handi-
capped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-3722, 100 Stat. 796 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(3)–(G), overturning Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
266 United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492, 500 (1936); accord
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974).
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 714-15 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Correspondingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged the Court's
broader discretion in overturning previous decisions resting on constitutional interpretation.
E.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169,
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of thousands of public sector employers have adopted race/gender-
conscious affirmative action programs:268 Overruling Weber would
create profound instability in labor-management affairs and en-
courage racial and gender divisiveness in the workplace. Further-
more, as Justice Jackson observed, "practical . . . and policy
considerations" 2"9 merit careful review before the Court departs
from the doctrine of stare decisis. In light of the pervasiveness of
affirmative action programs in the American workplace, both "prac-
tical ... and policy considerations" weigh heavily against the Court's
departing from the rule of stare decisis. This is not an instance,
moreover, in which the original disputed doctrine proved unwork-
able. While the Court has acknowledged that a principle of law
sound in theory but unworkable in practice does not merit stare
decisis protection, 27° that exception has no place-in this discussion.
As their telling numbers suggest, employers in both the public and
private sector have endeavored to conform to the general dictates
of Weber.
Finally, overruling Weber would be an unrestrained manifesta-
tion of judicial activism. The Court itself recently described the
relationship between the doctrine of stare decisis and the concept of
rule of law:
[S]tare decisis [is] the means by which we ensure that the
law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in
a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine per-
mits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of in-
dividuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our
constitutional system of government, both in appearance
and in fact. 2"
2192-93 (1986) (dissenting opinion of White, J., in which Rehnquist, J., joined); Batson v.
Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1731 (1986) (dissenting opinion or Burger, C.J., in which Rehn-
quist, J., joined); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand Sc Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
381 (1977) (majority opinion by Rehnquist, J.); see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,
101 (1978) (majority opinion by Rehnquist, J.); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
260 See supra note 93.
269 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 594 (1944) ( Jackson,
J., dissenting).
27° Compare Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988)
(overruling Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co„ 317 U.S. 188 (1942) and Endow v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935)) with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
27 ' Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986).
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For the Court to reject Weber would inevitably lead to the public
perception that "the proclivities of individuals" outweighed a bed-
rock principle of Title VII construction.
In addition to respect for the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court
should reject the appeal of the Johnson dissenters for a second
reason. The principle underlying Weber's approval of race-conscious
criteria was the Court's conclusion that such employment decisions
were consistent with the "spirit" of Title VII, i.e., Congress's goal
of bringing blacks into the employment mainstream of the Ameri-
can economy. In recent years, even under the Reagan Administra-
tion, 272
 there has been an abundance of reports and studies con-
cluding that race/gender-conscious programs are doing just that.
For example, in 1984, the Potomac Institute issued an exhaustive
study of minority and female employment in the 1970s. It con-
cluded that affirmative action programs provided minorities and
women with higher paying jobs from which they traditionally had
been excluded. 27S The Department of Labor 274 and the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance have reached the same conclusion. 275
272
	 Reagan Administration seriously considered amending OFCCP goals and time-
table requirements. See supra note 264. The proposal set off considerable debate within the
Administration, pitting Secretary of Labor William Brock, who favored their retention,
against Attorney General Edwin Meese and Associate Attorney General for Civil Rights
William Bradford Reynolds, who vigorously supported their deletion. See N.Y. Times, May
26, 1986, at A1, col.4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1985, at A22, col.3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1985,
at A28, col.1; N.Y. Times, Nov. I, 1985, at A19, col]. The controversy became such a
political hot potato that the Administration decided to postpone its resolution until the
Supreme Court decided Paradise and Johnson. Not surprisingly, it has shown no interest in
reviving the proposed amendments. Present and former Administration officials have been
highly critical of the Court's decisions in these cases. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 4 (The
Week in Review) at 1, co1.1; N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, at Al, col.4.
2" H. HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPORTUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1970's
5 (1984).
274 EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT PAT-
TERNS OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NON-CONTRACTOR ESTAB-
LISHMENTS (1984). An earlier study, also commissioned ,by the Department of Labor, had
reached a similar conclusion with respect to black males, but was uncertain of the impact of
Executive Order 11246 on other minority-group members and women. J. LEONARD, THE
IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE AcTIoN (1983). This study also addressed Justice Scalia's argument
that race/gender-conscious plans result ill hiring minimally qualified minority-group members
and women. Leonard rejected this conclusion on the ground that the productivity level of
these two groups had actually increased in proportion to that of white males. Id.
A small number of critics maintain that affirmative action programs have actually hurt
the economic progress of minorities. Butler & Heckman, The Government's Impact on the Labor
Market Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
248-67 (1977); Sowell, Myths About Minorities, 68 COMMENTARY 33 (Aug. 1979).
275 OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NON-CONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS,
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The fact that affirmative action has been effective in eradicating
barriers to the advancement of minorities and women does not
mean that Congress's goal has been met. Indeed, despite the prog-
ress it reported, the Potomac Institute warned against dismantling
race/gender-conscious programs because of the continuing adverse
economic and social conditions confronting minorities'and women.
Recent studies show that the economic gap between minorities and
non-minorities remains large. For example, in 1985 the unemploy-
ment rate for Blacks and Hispanics was 13% and 8.8%, respectively,
whereas the White unemployment rate was 5.3%. 276 Even those
minorities who are fortunate enough to be regularly employed are
at a disadvantage. The median income for White families in 1986
was $30,809; the median income for Black and Hispanic families
was $17,604 and $19,995, respectively. 277 The median net worth of
White households is approximately twelve times greater than the
median for Black households ($39,135 as compared to $3,397).278
The economic status of women is equally distressing. The me-
dian income of women in 1985 was $7,217 compared to the median
income of men which was $16,311. 279 The median income of full-
time female workers in 1986 was $16,843 compared to the median
income of full-time male workers which was $25,894. 280 More recent
data compiled by the Department of Labor shows that women on
the average earn only 70 percent as much as men. 281
In sum, a careful examination of the economic data available
shows that, although affirmative action plans are working, much
remains to be done to insure the full participation of women and
minorities in the American economy. Dismantling race/gender-con-
scious programs would clearly be counter-productive.
At first glance, it might appear that a policy argument such as
the one just described is more properly made to the politically
accountable branches than to the Court. Reflection reveals this crit-
icism is meritless, however. The Court cannot fulfill its duty to say
what the law is in a vacuum. It must understand how "the law" (in
1974-1980, 37 (1984). See Lconard, The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment, 121 LAB.
EcoN. 439 (1984).
" 11 U.S. DE.PT OF LABOR, 108 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 62 (July 1988).
277 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1988, 427, Table 700.
"Hid. at 440, Table 727.
2" Id, at 432, Table 710.
25 Id, Table 71 1.
2" N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1988, at A20, col. 3.
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this instance, race/gender-conscious plans adopted by public em-
ployers) operates. Undoubtedly, the Court would overstep its role
as an interpreter of the law if it approved such plans simply because
a majority of the Justices endorsed their use as a matter of policy.
On the other hand, when the Court is being asked to overrule the
decision that upheld such programs as consistent with Title VII, it
should not be faulted for considering whether they are fulfilling
the "spirit" that inspired Congress to enact Title VII in the first
place and that has so dramatically shaped its own jurisprudence.
In sum, for the Court to overrule Weber would not only be flatly
inconsistent with the doctrine of stare decisis, but it would also wreak
havoc with widespread employment practices. Overruling Weber
would frustrate the "spirit" of Title VII. It would undermine the
goal of Congress, which prompted Title VII's original enactment
in 1964 and its amendment in 1972.
The Court's reaffirmation of Weber, moreover, should tran-
scend its divided jurisprudence. There should be no more hedging,
no more majority/plurality opinions, no more opinions concurring
in part, and no more opinions concurring in the judgment. Those
Justices who believe that Weber was correctly decided should say so
in unison. Their opinion should offer concrete guidance, not vague
platitudes.
Ideally, in reaffirming Weber in the context of public sector
employment, the Court should select a case raising reverse discrim-
ination claims under both Title VII and the equal protection clause
to resolve the uncertain relationship between the two norms. The
Court should use the case, moreover, as a vehicle for resolving the
two issues analyzed in Part II of this article: (1) the inconsistency
between Wygant's prima facie standard and Johnson's "manifest im-
balance" standard and (2) the conflict between the Court's approval
of the disparate impact theory of liability under Title VII and the
Court's disapproval of remediation of societal discrimination as an
acceptable predicate for race/gender-conscious relief under the
equal protection clause.
In this author's view, the Court should adopt the "manifest
imbalance" standard. A public employer needs the certainty of a
safety net, not the tension of a tightrope, in fashioning race/gender-
conscious plans. Since the prima facie standard is more rigorous than
the "manifest imbalance" standard, its adoption would inhibit the
implementation of race/gender-conscious programs. The "manifest
imbalance" standard provides a public employer with a safety net
because it diminishes the likelihood a court will subsequently second
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guess the employer's evaluation of the statistical disparity between
the racial composition of its workforce and the racial composition
of the appropriate labor pool. It will encourage voluntary settle-
ments and discourage protracted litigation. Protracted litigation un-
der Title VII is time-consuming for the courts, counsel, and cor-
porate management, and promotes racial divisiveness among
employees. A rule of law which encourages settlement advances
Congress's intent in enacting Title V 11. 282
In resolving the issue of which standard to apply, the Court
should admit, moreover, that "manifest imbalance" is really the flip
side of Hazelwood's adverse-impact liability standard. As such, "man-
ifest imbalance" is actually premised upon societal discrimination,
not discrimination by the public sector employer. In withholding
from the state the right to correct a wrong that ultimately operates
to injure the entire society — not just the victims of discrimination
— the Court is usurping the role of the politically responsive
branches of government. If, consistently with the Constitution, the
state can legislate the price of a quart of milk to help the farmer,
or the price of a taxi-ride to help the consumer, why should the
Court prohibit the state from helping the entire society by eradi-
cating the vestiges of discrimination?
The standard rejoinder to this question is, of course, that race,
because of its immutability, is inherently different from other char-
acteristics such as economic status; and as a matter of principle, it
should be irrelevant to government decision-making. This answer,
however, is fundamentally destructive of society. It results in the
states possessing limited discretion in resolving the pressing prob-
lem of eradicating the vestiges of discrimination and virtually un-
checked discretion in resolving problems of a more mundane char-
acter.
A further anomaly in the Court's position denying public em-
ployers the right to correct societal discrimination lies in a misallo-
cation of power between the public and private sector. By imposing
a more rigorous standard on public employers under the equal
protection clause, the Court grants private employers greater power
than the state to correct societal discrimination. The citizenry elects
public officials — not corporate officials — to resolve society's most
vexatious ills. The Court should not render those officials consti-
tutionally impotent to address societal discrimination that infects
their own workplace.
2" See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
88	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1
B. Congress Should Amend Title VII to Authorize Public Employers to
Implement RacelGender-Conscious Plans
When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to broaden its
coverage to include state employees, it did so pursuant to its au-
thority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 283 Although
the Supreme Court has not directly passed on the constitutionality
of the 1972 amendment, there can be no serious question concern-
ing Congress's power to outlaw employment discrimination by the
states. Nor should there be any serious question concerning Con-
gress's power under section 5 to amend Title VII further to permit
the states to implement race/gender-conscious programs to remedy
the vestiges of discrimination.
Section 5 provides: "Congress shall have the power to enforce
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. "289 The
leading case in which the Court addressed the scope of Congress's
section 5 power is Katzenbach v. Morgan. 285 That case involved a
challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
Congress specifically adopted pursuant to section 5. Congress en-
acted section 4(e) to overcome the effects of a New York state statute
which had effectively disenfranchised New York's Puerto Rican
citizens through the use of an English language literacy test. Section
4(e) affirmatively mandated that any citizen with a sixth-grade ed-
ucation from any public school under the jurisdiction of the United
States, including Puerto Rico, be permitted to vote in all American
elections .286
Prior to Katzenbach, the Court had upheld a North Carolina
literacy requirement similar to New York's. 287 The challengers to
the constitutionality of section 4(e) argued that Congress lacked the
2" Congress enacted Title VII in 1964 pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority.
Although Congress's authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause is broad, it is not absolute.
Legislation premised on Congress's Commerce Clause authority must be consistent with the
equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See R.
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 4.8, at 293 n.3 (1986). Weber strongly suggests that race/gender-conscious pro-
grams do not violate the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment and should not
therefore violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. "Equal protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiarn); accord Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
2" U.S. CoNs .r. amend. XI V, § 5.
2" 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
286 Id. at 652-53.
287 Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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authority to outlaw a practice previously found by the Court not to
violate the fourteenth amendment. The Katzenbach Court, however,
rejected this argument, adopting a sweeping view of Congress's
authority to define the rights protected by the equal protection
clause. Observing that the drafters of the fourteenth amendment
intended to give Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause," 288 the Court specifically held that
section 5 did not "confine the legislative power in this context to
the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of
merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing
the 'majestic generalities' of § 1 of the Amendment." 289
The implications of this language are highly significant for
solving the Title Vu /equal protection clause conundrum created by
the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. Congress in 1972 used
its section 5 power to create a right to be free from employment
discrimination. Under the rationale of Katzenbach v. Morgan, it can
now use its section 5 power to amend Title VII to authorize the
states to protect that right in a particular fashion.29°
Opponents of such an amendment are likely to invoke the so-
called "one way ratchet theory" of section 5 which restricts Congress
to affirmatively expanding rights. Katzenbach expressly disavowed
the proposition that Congress could use section 5 to dilute the
guarantee of equal protection. In the opponents' view, permitting
the states to adopt race/gender-conscious plans would dilute the
rights of non-minority employees. The Court's decision in Fullilove,
" 
384 U.S. at 650. The sweep of Congress's powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause is virtually unbounded, except for the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 319 (1819). See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CoNsTrruTioNAL LAW 5-14 (2d ed. 1988); Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1983);
Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603,
614 (1975).
"a 384 U.S. at 648-49, The Court's post.Katzenbach jurisprudence concerning the scope
of section 5 is less than crystalline. E.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259-64 (1983)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33
(1983).
2"0 384 U.S. at 648-49. A student commentator has argued that even without an amend-
ment, a court could read Title VII in light of section 5 and Katzenbach u. Morgan to permit
the state to adopt race/gender-conscious programs. Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans by
Public Employers: The Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and The Equal Protection Clause, 56
FottintAm L. Rev. 403, 424-29 (1987). This argument seems strained. Congress's intent in
Katzenbach v. Morgan was clear and undisputed. No similar claim can be made respecting the
1972 amendments to Title VII.
90	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 30:1
however, undercuts any reliance on the "one-way ratchet" theory.
In that case, six of the Justices rejected a similar argument ad-
dressed to Congress's power under the equal protection component
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment."' Although
Fullilove involved a minority business set-aside program, the ration-
ale in that case can be directly applied to employment-related de-
cisions. Fullilove clearly indicates that Congress possesses the au-
thority to authorize the states to adopt race/gender-conscious
affirmative action plans without the necessity of a prior, formal
finding of government-sponsored discrimination by an administra-
tive, legislative or judicial body. 292
Such a congressional enactment contains obvious advantages.
Foremost, it would provide a solution worked out by the political
branches of government. The statute, therefore, would possess a
greater claim to democratic legitimacy than any "doctrine of affir-
mative action" formulated by the Court."' By casting race/gender-
2'r Congress's affirmative power to create substantive rights under section 5 has been
ably defended. E.g., Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
Rev. 199 (1971); Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 91 (1966); Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
29 In Fullilove, there was no opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
which Justices Powell and White joined expressly acknowledged the authority of Congress
under section 5 to enact the 10 percent set-aside program for minority business enterprises;
it noted "congressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful discrimination
to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects of past
discrimination." 448 U.S. at 477. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in the judgment in
which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined did not specifically address the issue of Con-
gress's power under section 5. Their position on this issue is clear, however. Justice Brennan's
opinion in Bakke, in which Justices Blackmun and Marshall joined, took a very sweeping view
of Congress's authority under section 5 "to accord preferential treatment to the victims of
past discrimination in order to overcome the effects of segregation." 438 U.S. at 368. That
opinion, moreover, recognized the state's right to correct societal discrimination. Although
Justice Stevens dissented on the merits in Fullilove and did not reach the equal protection
issue in Bakke, his opinions in Wygant and Johnson leave little doubt that he would recognize
Congress's authority under section 5 to amend Title VII to permit the states to adopt race/
gender-conscious plans.
293 See Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1188 (1977).
Professor Sandalow has observed:
[111 governmental action trenches upon values that may reasonably be regarded
as fundamental, that action should be the product of a deliberate broadly based
political judgment. The stronger the argument that governmental action does
encroach upon such values, the greater the need to assure us that it is the
product of a process that is entitled to speak for the society. Legislation that has
failed to engage the attention of Congress, like the decision of subordinate
governmental institutions, does not meet that test, for it is likely to be the
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conscious programs as part of the nation's labor policy, Congress
would take a significant step in reducing the divisiveness that such
plans cause. Non-minority employees might still disagree with the
policy of conferring a benefit on non-victim, minority employees,
but they would accept it as a policy that won out in the give-and-
take of the political process, rather than seeing it as a measure
imposed on an ad hoc basis by an employer or a court. Such an
amendment to Title VII might actually benefit non-minority em-
ployees in several respects. For example, Congress could adopt in
statutory form Weber's "impact" analysis to insure that non-minority
employees were not entirely foreclosed from hiring and promotion
opportunities.294 Such an amendment might put a cap on the nu-
merical goals that a public employer could adopt. Congress could
even require some due process form of notice and an opportunity
to be heard before a public employer implemented a race/gender-
conscious program in order to insure public participation in the
decision-making process.
The advantages of such an amendment to the public employer
are obvious as well. An amendment could provide a safety net,
rather than a tightrope, by defining the kind and quantum of
statistical evidence needed before a public employer could imple-
ment a race/gender-conscious plan. The amendment could
strengthen the net by explicitly forbidding the introduction of evi-
dence of such a plan in a Title VII liability case. Finally, to encour-
age the voluntary adoption of meaningful plans, it might even
create a "good faith" defense in adverse-impact liability cases, if the
public employer could show it acted reasonably in discovering the
adverse impact and in attempting to correct it prior to the institution
of litigation.
C. The Court Should Limit Wygant to Its Facts and Permit the States to
Adopt Reasonable, Short-Term MBE Legislation
After the Supreme Court's decision in Fullilove sustaining the
ten percent set-aside for minority business enterprises, many states
and municipalities enacted legislation similar to the federal statute.
Challenges to these statutes generally centered on the competence
product of partial political pressures that are not broadly reflective of the society
as a whole.
Id.
2" See supra note 143,
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of the legislative authority295 and the scope of the set-aside. 296 For
the most part, the courts rejected these challenges. Wygant has
spurred new constitutional challenges to such legislation. To date
four courts of appeals have invalidated MBE programs based on
this decision. 297
The constitutional challenges in these four cases centered on
issues directly analogous to the ones discussed in Part II: (1) the
character of the factual predicate needed by the state or munici-
pality before it could adopt the race/gender-conscious plan, and (2)
whether the state or municipality could adopt such a plan to remedy
societal discrimination.
It will be recalled that in Wygant the Court took Hazelwood, a
pure Title VII liability case, and jurisprudentially inverted it, first
by applying it to a case involving the equal protection clause and
second, by applying it to a reverse discrimination claim, rather than
a liability claim. Wygant instructed a public employer that it should
follow Hazelwood's admonition and compare the racial composition
of its workforce to the racial composition of the appropriate labor
pool in deciding whether to implement a race/gender-conscious
program. Wygant also insisted that the employer could act only to
remedy its own discrimination, not society's at large.
Subsequent to Fullilove in 1980 and prior to Wygant in 1986,
many states and political subdivisions enacted MBE programs in
which the percentage of public contracts set-aside corresponded to
the percentage of minorities in the general population or in an
undifferentiated labor pool. Wygant appears to constitutionally con-
295 E.g., South Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metro-
politan Dade County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846, 852 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984);
Ohio ContractOrs Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 171-72 (6th Cir. 1983); Schmidt v. Oakland
Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S.
594 (1982); Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100
Wash. 2c1 109, 121-22, 667 P.2d 1092, 1099 (1983); Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors
of Am., Ala. Branch, Inc., 403 So. 2d 893, 899-902 (Ala. 1981); see also M.C. West, Inc. v.
Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338, 343-49 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Central Ala. Paving, Inc. v. James, 499
F. Supp. 629, 636-38 (M.D. Ala. 1980).
296
 Ex., South Florida Chapter, 723 F.2d at 855-56; Ohio Contractors Ass'n, 713 F.2d at 173-
75; Schmidt, 662 F.2d at 559-60; Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp.
173, 187-90 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed, 742 F.2d 1456; Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'!
Elec. Contractors, 100 Wash. 2d at 122-26, 667 P.2d at 1100-01; Arrington, 403 So. 2d at 902—
04.
297 Michigan Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987); J.A. Croson Co. v.
City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1978), prob. juri.r. noted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1988); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987); J. Edinger & Son, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 802 F.2d 213 (6th
Cir. 1986). But see H.K. Porter Co. v. Metro Dade County, 825 F.2d 324 (11th Cir. 1987).
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demn any MBE program which rested its factual predicate on a
general statistical disparity between the minority population and the
percentage of contracts awarded to minority contractors. Such re-
liance would be directly analogous to the school board's reliance on
the statistical imbalance between the school district's minority pupil
population and the number of minority teachers it actually em-
ployed, which the Court struck down in Hazelwood.
In almost all instances, the application of Wygant creates an
insurmountable problem for states and municipalities in adopting
MBE-type legislation. In determining whether to extend that case's
rationale beyond the realm of employment to encompass govern-
inent expenditures, the Court must come to grips with the signifi-
cant societal differences reflected in employment statistics and en-
trepreneurial statistics. Where entrepreneurial statistics do exist,
they often show a very small percentage of local minority contrac-
tors. It is estimated that only 4.7% of all construction firms in the
United States are owned by minority group members; forty-one
percent of those firms are concentrated in five states, leaving 2.8%
for the remaining forty-five states." 8 Application of Wygant's anal-
ysis to these statistics dooms MBE programs in those remaining
forty-five states, if they set aside any percentage of contracts except
the most minimal.
Application of Wygant's analysis should be rejected for three
reasons. First, Wygant blindly ignores the crucial role played by the
employment practices of the construction industry itself. As the
Supreme Court noted in Weber, so many courts have amassed an
abundance of evidence of discrimination in the craft trades that
other courts can properly take judicial notice of minority exclu-
sion. 2°° If minority group members do not have access to skilled
trades training and jobs, how can they be expected to operate their
own construction companies? To the extent that Wygant requires
close parity with the appropriate minority entrepreneurial pool, it
locks MBE's into the status quo.
Second, linking the MBE set-aside to the actual percentage of
minority contractors in the appropriate labor pool has the anoma-
lous result of making it almost impossible to assist construction firms
owned by minority group members in areas where white contractors
and businesses have been most successful in discriminating against
them. This is a near perfect example of the states' need to correct
Croson Go., 822 F.2d at 1363 11.7.
"9
 443 U.S. at 198 n.l.
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societal discrimination. 3°° Without the ability to remedy the effects
of this societal discrimination by setting aside a portion of their
public contracts, state and municipal authorities lack a most effective
tool to stimulate minority entrepreneurial efforts.
Third, linking MBE percentages to the percentage of local
minority contractors overlooks standard business practices in the
construction industry. The nature of the construction industry is
such that depending upon the subject matter of the contract, a
prime contractor can often purchase goods from, or subcontract
parts of a job to, businesses outside the immediate area of the
project. That these "remote" purchases and subcontracts are made
in the regular course of business puts a state's percentage require-
ment of MBE participation in a public works project in a different
light. If market considerations can prompt a prime contractor to
purchase goods and services nationwide or regionwide, the equal
protection clause should not prohibit a similar result. Forcing the
prime contractor to do business with a qualified MBE outside the
immediate geographic area should not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation, especially when the state is regulating the disbur-
sal of the state's own funds. 30 '
"" See supra note 140. In order to avoid admitting prior discrimination against minority
contractors, state and municipal governments often stressed the need to correct societal
discrimination. For example, the Birmingham, Alabama City Council included in the opening
statement of the "findings and purpose" clause of the municipality's set-aside ordinance the
following statement:
Due to historical patterns and practices of racial discrimination, minority busi-
ness enterprises have not obtained an equitable share of contracts or subcon-
tracts let by the city for construction and for the purchase of goods, materials,
equipment or services. Though past official policies of overt discrimination
against minorities have now ceased, the existing policies and programs of the
city have not effectively eliminated the lingering present effects of this past
discrimination. The city has a compelling interest in eradicating the present
effects of past discrimination, and in promoting equality of economic oppor-
tunity among and between all of its citizens.
Arrington, 403 So. 2d at 896.
Similarly, the Michigan legislature in enacting a set-aside program observed that MBEs
and WBEs:
receive a disproportionately small share of state spending for construction and
goods and services in relation to their proportion of the state's population. That
minorities and women have been systematically denied equal opportunity in
this country is a sad historical fact now generally accepted and widely recognized
in legislation of the past two decades. In the interests of justice as well as the
social and economic health of the state, the legislature should do all that it can
to ensure that businesses owned by minorities and women obtain their fair share
of the state's business.
" 1 cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity V. Mayor
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There are two principled ways for the Court to distinguish
Wygant without undermining that case's precedential value in em-
ployment discrimination cases. One way is to analogize MBE pro-
grams to race/gender-conscious hiring plans. Justice Powell carefully
distinguished between hiring plans and layoff plans in Wygant, of-
fering a tentative endorsement of the former because "hiring goals
impose a diffuse burden." 3°2 This approach shifts the focus of the
Court's constitutional analysis to the program's impact and away
from the factual predicate supporting the percentage set-aside. A
similar argument proved persuasive in Fullilove; the trial record
contained exhaustive statistics showing that the 10% set-aside would
ultimately deprive white contractors of less than 0.25% of the total
monies expended in the United States for construction. 303 In re-
viewing the constitutionality of state MBE programs, the Court
should examine what percentage of funds are being withdrawn
from competition with non-minority firms. At a bare minimum, a
percentage figure that is comparable to the percentage of minority
workers in the local construction industry should be acceptable.
Adopting the approach of the Court in Johnson, this author would
argue by analogy that a percentage figure that is comparable to the
percentage of minority workers in the general labor pool is an even
more appropriate standard because entry level jobs in the construc-
tion industry generally require few specialized skills. This percent-
age figure based on the general labor pool seems particularly ap-
propriate because, as noted earlier, owning an MBE without first
working in the construction industry is an unlikely career path.
A second way to distinguish Wygant without undermining its
precedential value in employment cases is to elaborate upon the
Court's requirement of "identified discrimination" as distinguished
from "societal discrimination." Justice Powell rejected societal dis-
crimination in Wygant as "too vague" and "too amorphous and over-
expansive." This criticism is simply not valid in reviewing MBE
legislation. As noted earlier, the Court itself has acknowledged the
extraordinary hostility of the construction industry toward minority
workers. It is difficult to imagine how the underlying discrimination
could be any further "identified." MBE legislation is not aimed at
correcting societal discrimination as that term was used in Wygant.
and Council of the City of Catiiden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984); White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
302 106 S. Ct. at 1851.
903 448 U.S. at 484-85 n.72.
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It is aimed at correcting identified discrimination in an industry
notorious for its opposition to equal employment opportunity.
Furthermore, approving state MBE legislation premised on
"identified discrimination" by the construction industry is entirely
consistent with Fullilove. In that case, the Court permitted Congress
to take the very same measures now being adopted by the states to
cure the very same evil, that is, the deliberate and continuing ex-
clusion of racial minorities from the construction industry. The
Court in Fullilove specifically refused to impose upon Congress the
requirement that the source of the discrimination be "identified
with the exactitude expected in judicial or administrative proceed-
ings." 304 The Court should not require more of the states by way of
identified discrimination than it did of Congress.
Finally, forbidding the state to remedy identified discrimination
in the absence of a causal link to the state ignores the fact that, by
contracting with the discriminatory contractor, the state becomes a
passive participant in the discrimination. To require it to continue
in this role seems particularly restrictive of the state's traditional
police powers, especially because the state is dispensing its own
funds, not acting as a regulator of private conduct.
In short, Fullilove rather than Wygant should guide the Court
in determining the constitutionality of state MBE programs. Reli-
ance on Fullilove is appropriate for another reason as well. Thin
case provides helpful guidelines to insure the reasonableness of
MBE programs. The Court should apply to state MBE programs
the same standard it applied to the federal program. Under this
standard, the percentage set-aside should not be excessive in light
of the total amount of construction funds available to.non-minority
firms, the duration of the program should be limited, and waivers
should be available in the event qualified MBE's cannot be lo-
cated. 305
CONCLUSION
The use of race/gender-conscious criteria in affirmative action
plans constitutes one of the most vexatious problems in public sector
employment law today. The origin of the problem lies in the si-
multaneous application of two separate antidiscrimination norms,
each with a different standard of liability. The difficulty of the
3" Id. at 478 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring).
3" 448 U.S. at 484-85 n.72.
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problem has been compounded by the Supreme Court's unsuccess-
ful efforts to transform the norms' liability principles into criteria
for determining whether a public sector employer possesses a suf-
ficient factual predicate to justify implementing an affirmative ac-
tion plan. The Court has failed to provide adequate guidelines to
resolve the constitutional and statutory problems analyzed in this
article. Indeed, it has rendered their resolution more difficult by
adopting essentially inconsistent principles under Title VII and the
equal protection clause: Title VII allows the public sector employer
to implement a race/gender-conscious plan to overcome the dispar-
ate impact of its employment practices, but the equal protection
clause denies it the authority to remedy societal discrimination.
The fundamentally differing views of the Justices concerning
race/gender-conscious hiring and promotion decisions by .public
sector employers have contributed significantly to this highly unsta-
ble jurisprudence. The Court has split into three factions: the con-
servative camp, which almost always opposes the use of race/gender-
conscious plans (except to remedy specific acts of discrimination);
the liberal camp, which almost always favors their use; and an
unaligned group, which lends voting strength to each camp on a
case-by-case basis. Close examination of the nine affirmative action
cases shows that only the most general principles can command
clear support from a majority of the justices.
Both the Court and Congress have a role to play in repairing
the Court's fractured jurisprudence. The Court should unequivo-
cally reaffirm the statutory and constitutional propriety of race/
gender-conscious plans in the context of public sector employment.
It should ,adopt the manifest imbalance lest under Title VII and
interpret the equal protection clause as .permitting the states to
remedy societal discrimination. Finally, the Court should reject an
extension of Wygant to state MBE programs that meet the reason-
ableness criteria suggested by Fullilove. Congress should invoke its
authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to amend
Title VII to expressly permit the adoption of race/gender-conscious
programs if a manifest imbalance exists between the racial and
gender composition of the public employer's workforce and that of
the appropriate labor pool and the plan adequately protects the
interests of non-minority employees.
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